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The phenomenon of pragmatic decisions is widely used by current political 
leaders to prove their foreign policy actions as the right ones, as illustrated 
by the discourses of German and Russian officials. But still the ‘pragmatic’ 
explanation does not result in the same decisions in these two states. This 
contradiction suggests that pragmatism is nothing but a rhetorical tool, 
which might be used differently.  
This thesis focuses on the rhetorical tools by means of which leaders of 
Russia and Germany pragmatize their foreign policy choices. Also the 
thesis is aimed to figure out the differences in the ways of pragmatization 
applied by Russian and German actors.  
The Aristotelian doctrine of practical syllogism, which is considered here 
as mechanism of pragmatization, discloses these rhetoric tools that are 
called ‘pragmatizing markers’. The rhetorical analysis revealed five groups 
of these markers: profit, right and thought, institutionalism, humanism, and 
ideal speech situation (ISS). Moreover, it showed that the conditions under 
which the decision is made (cooperation; different point of view; conflict) 
may affect the choice of pragmatizing markers.   
Comparative analysis showed that Russian and German actors have some 
common spaces as well as difference in applying the pragmatizing markers. 
Both use all five groups of the markers to some stance. The cases of 
conflict and different points of view urge the actors to resort to the model 
of ISS, while the case of cooperation is the most favorable for the marker 
of profit. In the conditions of conflict, the use of pragmatizing marker of 
right and thought significantly increases in both countries. As for the 
differences, Russian political leaders make their rhetoric more variable in 
cases of cooperation and different point of views and German ones does it 
in case of conflict. In addition, Russian actors tend to pragmatize with the 
help of institutional value, while German representatives prefer the value of 
humanism, which can be traced through the cases of conflict and differing 
points of view.   
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1. Introduction  
 
 There is an outstanding protagonist in Terry Pratchett's Discworld 
series that is called by the characters as Granny Weatherwax or Mistress 
Weatherwax. She is presented as an informal leader within the whole 
magic world. Moreover, she is a self-appointed guardian of her small 
country. In spite of the fact that this character has enormous magic power, 
she rarely uses it and prefers to appeal to ‘cold mind’, act rationally and 
pragmatically. So it is not surprising that other characters note that she 
always says: “We do right, we don’t do nice”, for instance, in Pratchett's 
novel I Shall Wear Midnight. 
 Such a justification of the actions sounds quite similar to the rhetoric 
of the real world political leaders, when they appeal to the others to act 
pragmatically, even if this might not seem nice for the latter. Also, when 
political leaders gain their points in different situations, they often use 
some supportive tools to show that their actions are ‘right’, while they are 
criticized for not being ‘nice’. So, it seems interesting to find out how 
different political leaders make their foreign policy decisions sound ‘right’.  
1.2 Relevance of the research 
  
 This thesis focuses on the rhetoric of political leaders of Russia and 
Germany, because the representation of these two countries as key actors at 
the international scale, including the European one, enables them to make 
claims for pragmatic solutions in various situations.  
 At the moment there is quite an impressive number of researches 
devoted to the issue of representing Russia and Germany as influential 
actors. For instance, it has been investigated by Maria Engström (2014), 
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Julien Nocetti (2015), Robert Kappel (2014), Simon Bulmer and William 
E. Paterson (2010), Adrian Hyde-Price and Charlie Jeffery (2001), and 
these are just the most recent works which cover this topic.  
 Such a positioning can be easily traced through self-perceptions of 
the states, which are reflected in their foreign policy doctrines: in Russia it 
is the new Foreign Policy Concept, which was signed by President 
Vladimir Putin in February 2013; in Germany it is a strategy paper entitled 
“Shaping Globalization – Expanding Partnerships – Sharing 
Responsibility” produced by the German Government in 2012. 
 Furthermore, it is possible to treat these two countries as ‘world 
powers’ due to a more, let it be called, objective factor of participating in 
international organizations. In the field of economy, Russia and Germany 
act through the World Trade Organization, Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, and such international forums as G20 and 
G8, although, on the grounds of the Ukrainian crisis Russia was excluded 
from G8, nevertheless, its representatives claim that they are still ready for 
further cooperation.  
 In the field of international security, both states are influential 
players in the United Nations. Russia is a permanent member of the UN 
Security Council with a right of veto. Germany is a non-permanent 
member, nevertheless, it has been already elected there five times. Besides, 
Germany is able to contribute to international security due to its 
membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization since 1955. In 
addition, Russia attempts to broaden the notion of international security so 
that it would cover cyberspace: in 2011 the idea of elaborating an 
international code of conduct for information security was introduced by 
the permanent representative of Russian along with ones of China, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.  
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 Meanwhile, focusing on the European scale, it goes without saying 
that Germany is one of the most significant driving forces of the European 
integration due to its political and economic weight. The role of Russia 
cannot be neglected here either, because it is one of the important EU 
partners. Moreover it is treated as some kind of counterweight with its idea 
of Eurasian Union, which contributes enough in forming the European 
identity. 
 Furthermore, the cases of Nord Stream Pipeline project, the 
problematics of the Near East in the example of Syrian crisis, and the 
Ukrainian crisis, which were chosen as time and subject framework for the 
analysis, highlight the importance of Russia and Germany on the European 
and world levels, and make this research topical.  
 Hence, as far as these two states have quite a lot in common, but still 
their foreign policy decisions do not always coincide, this thesis is tasked to 
compare the rhetoric of their political leaders. 
1.3 Research questions and goals 
 
 The aim of this thesis can be determined in two research questions. 
Firstly, I am going to figure out what rhetorical tools leaders of Russia and 
Germany apply to pragmatize their foreign policy choices. The second 
question urges for comparison, because I would like to find out, what are 
the differences in the ways of pragmatization applied by Russian and 
German actors. 
 These question set up the following goals of the research. To start 
with, it is necessary to introduce the notion of rational choice as a basis of 
rhetorical strategy of political leaders. This point will be revealed in 
theoretical chapter with the help of rational choice theory and its critique.  
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 Then it is crucial to determine the Aristotelian doctrine of practical 
syllogism on the basis of which I have constructed the methodological 
apparatus of the thesis. Methodology chapter will show how this doctrine 
can be used as pragmatizing mechanism in political rhetoric.  
 In addition, I have to demonstrate how these notions work in 
practice. For this I will analyze the speeches of Russian and German 
political leaders focusing on three cases: the Nord Stream Pipeline project, 
the Syrian crisis, and the Ukrainian crisis. I am going to show, by means of 
rhetorical analysis, how different pragmatizing markers work within the 
mechanism of practical syllogism and make the actors sound pragmatic. 
 Finally, I need to figure out the differences in usage of pragmatizing 
markers used by Russian and German actors, which will be achieved in the 
chapter devoted to comparative analysis.  
1.4 Theoretical and methodological issues 
 
 The theoretical chapter of the thesis focuses on the phenomenon of 
pragmatic decisions concerning discussions by international relations 
scholars. When discussing the idea of pragmatic decisions it is inevitable to 
appeal to the notions of pragmatic and pragmatism, and within this 
discipline there is the body of scholarship known as IR pragmatism (Adler 
and Pouliot, 2011; Hellmann 2009; Weber 2013). Nevertheless, I do not 
concentrate on it explicitly, but draw more attention to rational choice 
theory. 
  The proponents of rational choice theory argue that it is recognized 
as one of the ascendant paradigms in the field of social sciences (Opp 1999; 
Monroe 2001; Chai 2001; Aguiar & Francisco 2009). However, rational 
choice theory also faces much criticism both from the advocates (Aguiar & 
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Francisco 2009; Hausman 2001; Landa 2004; Davidson 1980; Elster 1989; 
Boudon 2003; Chai 2001) and opponents of it (Mccubbins & Thies 1996; 
Green and Shapiro, 1994; Monroe, 1996; Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 
1982; Nisbett and Ross, 1980; Almond, 1991; Barber, 1984; Eckstein, 
1991; Mansbridge, 1980; Green & Shapiro 1994; Snidal 2002).  
 The critique from rational choice theorists leads up to the division of 
the theory into, at least, two types of interpretations: narrow or explicit 
version and wide or internal version. Nevertheless, both versions share the 
same ground, which is concluded in rational optimization model or three 
basic assumptions. They provide a researcher with the toolkit of decision-
making process. Moreover, optimization model defines the idea that each 
actor pursues the aim of utility maximization. Hence, the proponents of the 
rational choice theory assume that all the people eventually act 
pragmatically. 
 The opponents of this theory, in their turn, insist that actors are not 
always pragmatic. This allows supposing, that rational choice theory is a 
basis of political rhetoric, when one actor appeals to another to act 
pragmatically.  
 Further on, in the methodology chapter I seek to figure out how the 
Aristotelian doctrine of practical syllogism can work as mechanism of 
pragmatization in political rhetoric. The idea of practical syllogism has 
been already examined by many philosophers (Kelsen 1973; Wright 1986; 
Broadie 1968; Schiller 1917; Hardie 1968). The understanding of the 
structure of the syllogism has allowed me to create a model for pragmatic 
decisions in political rhetoric, which will form the basis of my rhetorical 
analysis. 
 The method of rhetorical analysis is thoroughly investigated in 
different disciplines, including the IR (Gill and Whedbee 1997; Finlayson 
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2007; Condor et al. 2013), and linguistics (Joseph 2006). This method deals 
with different figures of speech, and metaphor seems to be one of the most 
popular one for the researchers (Lakoff and Johnson 2003; Marks 2011; 
Miller 1979). Nevertheless, my analysis revealed that metaphors are not as 
widely used for pragmatizing matters as could have been presupposed. So I 
concentrated on other figures of speech, which I called ‘pragmatizing 
markers’. I was able to identify five groups of them: profit, right and 
thought, institutionalism, humanism, and ideal speech situation. I order to 
prove their pragmatic nature I have to refer not only to rational choice 
theory, but also some researches in the field of neurosciences (McDermott 
2004) and semiotics (Habermas 1984).   
1.5 Empirical base and analysis 
 
 The choice of cases, as a topical framework of the research, arises 
from the aim to demonstrate how actors use pragmatizing markers in their 
rhetoric under different conditions. The cases have been chosen on the 
basis of that, and the following chapter explicates the rationale for 
comparing namely Russia and Germany. Hence, the case of the Nord 
Stream Pipeline project reveals the cooperation between Russia and 
Germany, the problematics of Syrian crisis presents the differing points of 
view while seeking for the same solution and, finally, the Ukrainian crisis 
shows the rhetoric under condition of conflict of two actors. 
 Thus, the data was collected from official web-sites of the president 
of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian 
Federation, The Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, and The 
Federal Foreign Office of Germany, in accordance to the topical timeframe. 
The data includes the transcripts of interviews, press-conferences, and 
official reports of political leaders of Russia (Putin, Medvedev, Lavrov, 
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Bogdanov) and Germany (Merkel, Westerwelle, Steinmeier) taken in 
original languages, Russian and German, and then translated into English 
(transcriptions can be found in appendix). 
 I have looked through 186 transcripts out of which 27 statements 
turned out to contain pragmatizing markers expressed by means of 45 
figures of speech. These were then chosen for closer scrutiny. Overall the 
data can illustrate how Russian and German political leaders make their 
decisions sound pragmatic. 
 In the chapter devoted to the rhetorical analysis of pragmatizing 
markers in the speeches of political leaders of Russia and Germany, I am 
going to figure out by applying practical syllogism model which of the 
markers are used by the actors, and how the condition of relations affects 
this usage. 
 In the following chapter, taking into account the results of rhetorical 
analysis, I will reveal the general points and differences in Russian and 
German usage of pragmatizing markers in their rhetoric.  
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2. Russia and Germany: Basis for Comparison 
  
 For comparative analysis I have chosen pragmatizing figures of 
speech used by political leaders in Russia and Germany, because these two 
countries represent key actors in international security and world economy. 
In order to confirm this standpoint, before examining the theoretical and 
methodological apparatus, it is thus necessary to have a closer look on 
positioning of Russia and Germany in these fields.  
2.1 Russia 
 
 To begin with Russian positioning as a key actor, I would like to 
draw attention to the new Foreign Policy Concept, which was signed by 
President Vladimir Putin in February 2013. This concept reflects not only 
the changes in the world order, official reaction to these changes, state’s 
priorities in solving global problems and regional priorities, and means of 
realization of foreign policy, but also lets us understand, how the country 
considers itself on the global stage. Maria Engström, a Swedish researcher, 
summarized this document noting, that in Russian point of view it is a 
significant military and economic actor in in the conditions of growing 
chaos and uncontrollability in international relations. In addition, the 
Concept includes an image of Russia as a particular civilization, which 
should share its values by means of ‘soft power’ (Engström 2014, 362). 
 Such a self-perception seems to me quite reasonable as far as 
Russian participation on global scale through authoritative international 
organizations and regional structures has an immense impact and 
ambitions. Interestingly enough, European Union also highlights 
importance of Russia as a key player in geo-political and security terms at 
both the global and regional level, which was mentioned in the 2003 
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European Union Security Strategy (European Commission 2003). And 
there are some reasons for this. 
 Above all, Russia is a permanent member of the UN Security 
Council, which lets it use a right of veto along with China, France, the 
Great Britain, and the United States of America with regard to the Charter 
of the United Nations, article 27. And Russia has used this right not only 
once, which can be seen in the following table:  
Table 1. Security Council - Veto List 
Data Agenda Item 
11 May 1993 The situation in Cyprus 
02 December 1994 
The situation in the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
21 April 2004 Cyprus 
12 January 2007 Myanmar 
11 July 2008 Peace and Security - Africa (Zimbabwe) 
15 June 2009 Georgia 
04 October 2011 Middle East - Syria 
04 February 2012 Middle East - Syria 
19 July 2012 Middle East - Syria 
15 March 2014 
Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent 
Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations 
addressed to the President of the Security Council 
22 May 2014 Middle East - Syria 
(Dag Hammarskiöld Library 2014).  
 Another curious moment is Russia’s position in cyberspace, which is 
considered both as a source of new thread and opportunities for resolution 
of foreign policy issues. In this connection, the state is trying to take a pro-
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active stand, so that its role in the field of the Internet governance cannot be 
neglected.  
 For instance, in 2011 permanent representatives of Russia, China, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan promoted an idea of elaborating International 
code of conduct for information security in order to come to international 
agreement “… on international norms and rules guiding the behavior of 
States in the information space” (Permanent Representatives of China, the 
Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 2011). This approach to the 
issue of cybersecurity, as noted by Julien Nocetti, is based on the 
understanding of cyberspace as part of a territory of a state, where 
international laws should also work (Nocetti 2015, 112). Consequently, the 
Internet has become a tool for Russian foreign policy, successfully used by 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, whose “security-driven internet governance 
agenda” approved itself during the World Conference on International 
Telecommunications summit in Dubai in December 2012 (Nocetti 2015, 
119).   
 Besides, Russia represents itself not only in the field of global 
security issues, but also in world economy by continuing integration in 
intergovernmental organizations, such as the World Trade Organization 
(further WTO) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development.  
 The 16
th
 of December 2011 witnessed the 8
th
 WTO Ministerial 
Conference approved that Russia may accede to the WTO Agreement, 
(WTO 2011) which was implemented on the 22
nd
 of August 2012, when 
Russia officially joined WTO as its 156th member. This step was highly 
welcomed by the WTO members: the Director-General Pascal Lamy 
evaluated it as a great achievement to the rule of trade law, which opens new 
opportunities for business operators and trade partners. Moreover, he noted 
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that by joining WTO family Russia attained a WTO “quality label” (Lamy 
2011). Working Party Chairman Ambassador Jóhannesson also admitted 
Russian prospects as strengthening actor of the multilateral trading system 
which can enhance global economic cooperation (WTO News Items 
2011a). Igor Shuvalov, Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister, in his turn, 
assured that Russia promises to make an outstanding contribution to 
securing international economic stability (WTO News Items 2011b).  
 Although Russia is not a member of Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (further OECD), it also plays a significant 
role here. According to the information presented on the official web-site 
of the organization, Russia actively participates through some committees 
and working groups, in addition, it has an opportunity to join the meetings 
of the OECD Global Forums and regional activities, which concern issues 
of non-OECD European countries. Moreover, Ministerial Council Meeting 
dialogue sessions with non-OECD economies are open for Russian 
Ministers.  This cooperation provides a sustainable platform for policy 
dialogue with Russia, which again points out a considerable role of the 
country on the global economy stance (OECD n.d.).  
 Another representative point here, in my opinion, is Russian 
Presidency of the G20, which took place in 2013. Summit G20 was highly 
estimated by the partners; moreover, Ambassador of Australia to the 
Russian Federation Paul Myler was inspired by the topics promoted by 
Russia, which included economic growth through quality jobs and 
investment, trust and transparency, and effective regulation, so he claimed 
that in 2014 Australia would keep this direction (Russia G20, 2013).  
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2.2 Germany 
 
 Undoubtedly, Germany is a key actor in both European and 
international security and economy, which is clearly represented in a 
strategy paper “Shaping Globalization – Expanding Partnerships – Sharing 
Responsibility” produced by the German Government in 2012. This 
document not only presents the state’s approach to world politics and new 
partnerships, but also reflects its self-perception on a global scale, likewise 
Foreign Policy Concept in case with Russia.  
 According to this strategy of the German government, Germany is 
represented as reliable partner upholding a reputation for quality products 
and technological innovation, who if proud of its own democratic system of 
governance, its social market economy; as a driving force behind European 
integration; as a reliable partner and ally that shoulders responsibility in the 
world (Federal Government of Germany 2012, 6-7).  
 This positioning is based on the actions of the country through the 
organizations of different levels, among which the most influential for 
Germany, as it seems to me, is the European Union, as it is claimed that 
“Germany acts with and through Europe” by promoting European positions 
and working in international forums together with EU and Council of 
Europe (Federal Government of Germany 2012, 9). This cooperation 
means a lot, which was noted by Robert Kappel in his article “Global 
Power Shifts and Germany’s New Foreign Policy Agenda”, in which he 
claims that EU is the most powerful trading block, and the biggest single 
economy in the world, as its share in global Gross Domestic Product and 
production counts 25 per cent (Kappel 2014, 342-343). And Germany, in 
fact, plays first violin in this influential union.  
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 Simon Bulmer and William E. Paterson notethat there are four stages 
of the policy cycle, when EU may be influenced by member states, among 
them is agenda-setting, where Germany has a crucial role and usually 
succeeds in promoting its own interests (Bulmer & Paterson 2010, 1055). 
Besides, the political weight of Germany also matters a lot due to the 
largest population within the Union and to being a founding force in the 
integration process, moreover, it has a unique experience in coalition-
building and multilevel governance, which finds a lot of similarities with 
the EU, and consequently, let the state to promote its domestic issues to the 
EU level. Surely, economic influence cannot be neglected: by the year 
2008 Germany contributed €7.836 billion, staying the largest contributor to 
the EU budget (Bulmer & Paterson 2010, 1056). 
 Furthermore, Germany is a dynamic participant in multilateral 
forums, such as G7/8 and G20, the latter became a platform for 
negotiations among finance ministers and central bankers due to Germany, 
as they suggested this initiative in 1999 in response to the Asian crisis of 
the 1990s (Federal Government of Germany 2012, 13). In addition to that, 
Germany will host the G7 Summit in June 2015, promoting the agenda, 
which will cover the key issues of global economy; foreign, security and 
development policy; energy security; protection of the marine environment, 
marine governance and resource efficiency; antibiotic resistance, neglected 
and poverty-related diseases, and Ebola; retail and supply chain standards; 
empowering self-employed women and women in vocational training.  
It should also be mentioned, that G7 members position themselves as 
“… key actors in international economic relations, and as such they carry 
great responsibility for creating reliable, sustainable and viable global 
economic conditions” (German G7 Presidency Agenda 2015). Among 
other economic forums Germany also highlights the role of OECD, which 
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member it is, in the field of development of strategies and codes for 
specific policy areas (Federal Government of Germany 2012, 13).  
 Essential role of Germany as an international economic actor is 
assumed by its membership In WTO, which has started since the 1
st
 of 
January in 1995. From German standpoint this organization is a key tool to 
challenge protectionism and limitations on market access or export 
restrictions, as well as to open the markets, which suits the requirements of 
the EU trade strategy. Germany contributes a lot by extending the areas of 
opening markets, which is presented in WTO+ agreements (Federal 
Government of Germany 2012, 36).  
 As for international security issue, unlike Russia, Germany was 
elected only as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council five 
times: 1977 – 1978, 1987 – 1988, 1995 – 1996, 2003 – 2004, 2011 – 2012 
(United Nations n.d.a), which nevertheless, let the state to approve itself as 
an important actor. Firstly, Germany is one of the countries, claiming for 
reform of the UN Security Council, meanwhile admitting its central role for 
maintaining peace (Federal Government of Germany 2012, 12). Secondly, 
German contribution is quite impressive: it deploys currently about 5,000 
soldiers, police officers and civilian experts as part of peace-keeping 
missions mandated by the United Nations; besides, it is rated as fourth-
largest contributor to the peace-keeping budget (United Nations  n.d.b). 
 Next significant organization, through which Germany can act on a 
global scale, is North Atlantic Treaty Organization. According to the 
German Government Strategy, NATO provides an essential basis for their 
common security policy (Federal Government of Germany 2012, 15). 
Germany joined the Alliance in 1955, but researchers note that it did not 
become a serious partner at once: R. Kappel points out, that first claims 
from NATO allies for more intensive participation in peacekeeping and 
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stabilization operations appeared in 1991, which lead up to an important 
exception in German constitution taken in 1994, due to which Germany 
was permitted to take part in out-of-area operations if they were approved 
by the Government and got the UN sanction (Kappel 2014, 345). As 
consequence, the Kosovo crisis in 1999 witnessed the first military 
operation supported by German combat forces, which by the way became a 
turning point in the country’s approach to military crisis management 
(Hyde-Price & Jeffery 2001, 705). 
2.3 Choosing the cases 
 
 For a detailed analysis of pragmatization, I have picked up the cases, 
which clearly approve the positioning of Russia and Germany as the key 
actors in international security and economy. Moreover, it seems 
interesting to me to find out what pragmatizing markers are used in the 
cases, which are treated differently by both states, by this I mean 
cooperation, or conflict, or just different points of view towards the state of 
affairs. This will let me to find out whether different markers are universal 
tools of pragmatization and can be easily applied in the situation of both 
cooperation and conflict, and in other cases; or there are some special 
figures of speech, which are used only in particular cases.  
 Following this idea I have chosen three cases: Nord Stream Pipelines 
Project, the problem of the Near East by the example of Syria, and the 
recent Ukrainian crisis.  
2.3.1 Cooperation: The Case of Nord Stream Pipelines Project 
 
  The EU’s annual demand is growing every year and is expected to 
reach 450 bcm by 2035 (Nord Stream 2014, 2). In response to this 
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challenge the Nord Stream Pipeline Project was created, which concerned  
building a twin-pipeline system, which will provide European consumers in 
Germany, Denmark, the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, the Czech 
Republic and other countries with direct access to some of the world’s 
largest gas reserves in Russia (Nord Stream 2013a, 1-3).  
 The Nord Stream AG is an independent international consortium 
established in 2005 in Zug, Switzerland, to plan, construct and operate the 
work of the two 1,224-kilometre natural gas pipelines through the Baltic 
Sea (Nord Stream 2013a, 1). It consists of five shareholders: OAO 
Gazprom, Russia, holding 51 percent stake in the joint venture; E.ON SE 
and BASF SE/Wintershall Holding GmbH, Germany, each holding 15.5 
percent; N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie, Netherlands and GDF SUEZ S.A., 
France, each holding 9 percent (Nord Stream 2014, 1). 
 For Europe the project became “of European interest”, when in 2006 
the European Commission, European Parliament and the Council of Europe 
put it into Trans-European Network-Energy guidelines (Nord Stream 2014, 
2). This decision is not surprising, as the project fits their requirements in 
terms of energy security and ecological policy. For the former, the Nord 
Stream Pipeline is going to cover about a third of additional import 
demand, setting a diversity of gas supply routes. As for Russia, this project 
provides it with additional northern route for Gazprom (Nord Stream 
2013a, 4).  
 As for ecological impact, additional supplies of gas are essential for 
EU, where its production is declining, while this fuel plays an important 
role in tackling the problem of CO2 emissions (Nord Stream 2013a, 3). 
Furthermore, Nord Stream cares a lot about its impact on the environment, 
which resulted in fruitful cooperation with different environment protecting 
experts and organizations. In consequence, The Environmental Impact 
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Assessments prepared a program of minimizing the impact bio-physical 
and social environment; in addition, more than 100 million euros was 
invested in environmental studies and project planning pursuing the same 
goal for geophysical part; for the stages of construction and operation of 
the pipelines an environmental and social monitoring program was 
elaborated, which deals with the physical, chemical, biological and socio-
economic environment issues (Nord Stream 2014, 3). 
 As far as the pipeline runs through the Baltic Sea, it covers territorial 
waters and exclusive economic zones of Russia, Finland, Sweden, 
Denmark, and Germany. This route became possible only after national 
permission of all these five countries; moreover, it required environmental 
consultations of nine Baltic Sea states, which were successfully held on the 
UNECE Espoo Convention (Nord Stream 2013b, 1). As a result the 
permission process took only three years, starting with submission of 
national permit applications in 2008 and finishing in 2010 when authorities 
of all five countries granted their permissions for Nord Stream Pipeline 
construction (Nord Stream 2014, 2). 
 Thus, the construction stage of the project started in April 2010 and 
was completed on budget and on schedule within 30 months, and the gas 
transportation in Europe began in November 2011 (Nord Stream 2013a, 2-
3).  
 Although, the Nord Stream Pipeline is a European-Russian project, 
Germany and Russia faced with lots of criticism from some European 
countries, which suspected it to turn into German-Russian project. This 
idea was eagerly refuted by both sides: for instance, Minister of State for 
Europe, Günter Gloser, emphasized: “the Nord Stream Pipeline is not a 
German-Russian project” at the economic forum held in Riga in June 2008 
(Gloser 2008). A year later foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier also 
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pointed out in an interview to a polish newspaper ‘Gazeta Wyborcza’, that 
the project is European, not German (Gazeta Wyborcza, 2009). However, it 
once again highlights that Germany and Russia act as key players in this 
case, and act in a cooperative way.  
2.3.2 Difference: The Case of Syria 
 
 Problematics of the Near East is a matter of concern not only for the 
region but for the whole world community, including Russia and Germany. 
At the meeting of German foreign Minister Westerwelle with Norwegian 
Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide the former noted that there are three 
great problems that produce potential threat to stability and peace 
throughout the region, which are the civil war in Syria, Iran nuclear 
program and the Middle East peace process (Westerwelle 2012). Russia is 
not reluctant to this problem too: it was reflected in the Foreign Policy 
Concept, according to which the state promises to make a significant 
contribution in stabilizing the situation in this region (The Foreign Policy 
Concept of the Russian Federation, 2013).  
 The Syrian crisis is a very complex one, even its observation is a 
special case for research that is why I would like to make just a brief 
observations of succession of events referring to the article prepared for the 
BBC news by Lucy Rodgers, David Gritten, James Offer and Patrick 
Asare.  
 The starting point of the crisis lies in the wave of protests claiming 
for President Assad’s resignation which burst in March 2011. Disorders 
expanded developing into the civil war, and in 2012 scuffles reached 
Damascus and second city of Aleppo. The conflict became more 
complicated with implementation of sectarian factor: confrontation 
between the country's Sunni majority and the president's Shia Alawite sect 
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added new backgrounds for violence. Strengthening of the jihadist groups, 
including Islamic State, use of chemical weapons, and humanitarian crisis 
did not let the world community to shut their eyes to all this. Attempts to 
stop violence and start negotiations were taken by the Arab League and the 
United Nations still they showed no practical result (Rodgers et al. 2015). 
 Throughout the conflict Russia and Germany took different points of 
view on the terms of resolution: while Russia supports President Assad’s 
regime insisting that external involvement in domestic affairs is 
impermissible, Germany and its allies claim that violence should be ended 
by any possible means. This led up to a set of Russian vetoes, which were 
already mentioned, of the UN Security Council resolutions, concerning 
external military involvement in Syrian domestic affairs. Nevertheless both 
are claiming to political solution. Hence, the case will grant pragmatizing 
markers used by political leaders in Russia and Germany in the conditions 
of different viewpoints on the issue.  
2.3.3 Conflict: The Case of Ukrainian Crisis  
 
 In order to make an image of the events which are called ‘Ukrainian 
crisis’, I would like to refer to the BBC news website again, as the article 
“Ukraine crisis in maps” has collected all the necessary events.  
 Abandoned implementation of an association agreement with the 
European Union in November 2013 is accepted as the beginning of the 
crisis, due to the fact, that this decision taken by President Viktor 
Yanukovych's government arouse a flood of protest known as 
‘Euromaidan’. As the result, resignation of the current president was 
achieved, but by that moment clashes between protesters and police had 
already entailed some casualties, and tension within the society continued 
to grow. Then, a Crimean referendum held on 16 March 2014 showed 
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almost 97 percent results in favor of the proposal to join the Russian 
Federation. EU and the USA interpreted it as annexation, and consequently, 
sanctions were imposed (BBC 2015). And as it is emphasized by the 
German newspaper ‘Spiegel’ led by Martin Hesse: “Germany has taken a 
leadership role in those efforts - a role that Berlin has sought to claim for 
itself since the early days of the unrest in Kiev” (Hesse et al. 2014).  
 Meanwhile, situation on the East of Ukraine became aggravated: on 
the 11
th
 of May 2014 referendums for independence were conducted in 
Donetsk and Luhansk, which were not recognized by Kiev or the West. 
Attempts to establish peace were taken by new president Petro Poroshenko, 
who was elected on the 25
th
 of May 2014, but still showed no results, as the 
conflict continued to escalate. Probably, the most effective steps were taken 
within the so-called ‘Normandy format’ meeting held in Minsk, Belarus, on 
the 12
th
 of February 2015, in which participated leaders of Russia, Ukraine, 
Germany and France (BBC 2015). 
  In my opinion, this case again highlights the leading position of 
Russia and Germany on the international security scale; however, it brings 
to the third option of relations, which is the condition of conflict, as far as 
Russian side is accused of conflict escalation, while both counties are more 
or less suffering from the consequences of mutually imposed sanctions.  
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3. Theoretical Framework: pragmatic decisions in terms of the 
rational choice theory 
 
 There is no single opinion about what certainly governs the human 
mind in decision-making process, why decision-makers prefer to act one 
way instead of some other. Nevertheless, it goes without saying, that an 
actor needs some sort of manual when a choice has to be made, especially 
in the field of politics. This also applies to Russian and German foreign 
policy decision-makers.   
 This chapter reviews how IR scholars have attempted to explain or 
understand decision-making processes. It focuses in particular on how 
pragmatic decisions have been discussed within the discipline. I first 
discuss notions of pragmatism in Machiavelli’s and Sun Ki-Chai’s work 
and then move on to consider what kind of understandings of ‘being 
pragmatic’ rational choice theory provides. Although I operate with the 
notion of pragmatic and pragmatism, I have made the decision not to 
explicitly focus on the body of scholarship known as IR pragmatism (Adler 
and Pouliot, 2011; Hellmann 2009; Weber 2013) which can be considered 
to share some points of departure with wide interpretations of rational 
choice theory while relating critically to its narrow and internalist versions. 
3.1 Virtù vs. pragmatism, or the clash of communities 
 
  The idea of some sort of a basis for perfect political rule was 
suggested long ago by Niccolo Machiavelli in the concept of virtù. 
However, this concept is quite diverse, which brings up some difficulties in 
its translation and consequently its understanding. This issue was 
thoroughly observed by Harvey C. Mansfield, who also underlined that 
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diversity of virtù can be easily traced through Machiavellian works 
(Mansfield 1996).  
 As it seems to me, this broadness of the concept allows claiming that 
there are some specific set of values admitted within each community as 
virtù, formulated by means of culture, or traditions, or ideology. And a 
ruler who acts accordingly to these values is treated as a man of virtù, 
which puts him or her on the top of the hierarchy of this community. 
Meanwhile, the actors, who neglect these commonly assumed values and 
are guided with their own interests, are treated as some kind of outsiders, so 
they occupy the lower niche of the hierarchy of the community.  
 Nevertheless, it is noted, that this concept of virtù does not refer to 
some conventional virtues, but as Cary Nederman notes, it may require 
even completely evil actions. That is, Machiavelli can be interpreted to 
suggest that instead of being based on ideas and norms, decisions are often 
pragmatic. Machiavelli insists that the perfect ruler needs to choose 
between good and evil in terms that “fortune and circumstances dictate” 
(Machiavelli 1965, 66). Taking this into account, in general outline a 
person of virtù has to obtain a ‘flexible disposition’, according to 
Machiavelli’s recommendation (Nederman 2014).  Due to this remark, the 
‘upper level’ leaders do not lose their reputation when they step down 
towards pragmatic actions under conditions of clash of communities. 
 This possibility of betraying the common virtues in favor of 
pragmatism was also noted by Sun-Ki Chai, whose positive theory of 
ideology formation claims to explain the phenomenon of internalization of 
oppositional ideologies in ex-colonial countries. He argues that in a 
situation of interest disharmony between two groups (communities), the 
actors have to choose between conflict and peaceful resolution of this 
disharmony. This is where pragmatism becomes a determinant force in 
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decision-making process, as far as the actors have to estimate costs and 
benefits, which are not possible to predict for either choice. Hence, the 
actors seek to reduce expected regret, which is possible with internalization 
of a set of values from the oppositional ideology (Chai 2001, 150).  
 Thus, this decision promotes an appearance of the third niche in the 
hierarchy of the community. Chai puts it this way (Chai 2001, 151): 
For a situation in which members of an indigenous group are 
engaged in collective action in order to wrest state control of their 
territory of residence from members of a nonindigenous group, 
emergent ideologies will therefore prescribe believes and preferences 
that address identity problems linked specially to participation in 
such action. Such believes and preferences clearly correspond with 
the types of ideologies that are usually referred to as nationalist. 
 This way, from the perspective of the other community, the hierarchy 
will look like: the upper level of men and women of their virtù, the middle 
level of pragmatic actors, and the lower level of those who neither respect 
the values of this community, nor act pragmatically (nationalists). By 
contrast, within the community the image of hierarchy is totally diverse. 
Thus, by claiming for pragmatic actions, the community elevates the 
opposite one, while for the latter this will be treated as downshifting. 
Although, this can still result in conflict, nevertheless, pragmatic actions 
represent, in this interpretation, the golden mean for both communities. 
Consequently, when one side reciprocates the other’s claims, it becomes 
possible to set the common ground to unify them. Following this idea, the 
foreign policy rhetoric is based in either prompting the other side to be 
pragmatic, or persuading the opponents that the actor is pragmatic. 
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3.2 What does it mean ‘to be pragmatic’? 
 
 The rational choice theory provides a full explanation of ‘being 
pragmatic’, as far as it excludes any debates on the issue of values versus 
rationality, claiming that every decision made by an individual is 
unconditionally pragmatic. This idea, as it was noted by Kristen Monroe, 
was first conceived in classical microeconomics by Adam Smith, claiming 
that an actor’s behavior is based on his or her self-interest, subject to 
information and opportunity costs. In response to Hobbes’s argument about 
self-centered human nature, Smith managed to explain how it is possible to 
reach a collective welfare when everyone is concentrated on his or her own 
personal interests, without the help of authoritarian power (Monroe 2001, 
152).  
 Although, Smith limited the significance of his theory to economic 
approach only, rational choice theory had been developed further, and by 
the 1970s it was recognized as one of the ascendant paradigm in the field of 
social sciences (Monroe 2001, 153). At present, while the theory has faced 
some criticism, which I will review below, it has continued to occupy a 
central positon in the fields of economics, political science, international 
relations studies, psychology, sociology, anthropology, philosophy, and 
linguistics (Chai 2001, 1-2). 
 Such a continuing reputation is enjoyed due to three advantages the 
theory provides with, which are, according to S. Chai, generality, 
parsimony, and decisiveness. Concerning generality, meaning a common 
set of assumptions working as a base of the theory, the whole range of 
different variants of the rational choice theory are able to resist the 
criticism about arranging the facts in favor of the results of the research. 
Moreover, in the case when for analysis “… few systematic empirical data 
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exist… ”, this base helps to produce mid-range theories and hypotheses 
(Chai 2001, 9).  
 Another advantage, from which rational choice theorists benefit, is 
parsimony. Chai notes, that combination of optimization model along with 
assumptions of information, commonly shared knowledge of rationality, as 
well as the self-interest utility function let the rational choice theorists 
looking at the variety of choices as structural position. In a combination 
with generality, it thus becomes possible to use the theory in all 
environments (Chai 2001, 9-10). 
 Moreover, the core assumptions give a rise for creating decisive 
interpretations of theory, which significantly restrict the possible set of 
outcomes, as it takes into account only ‘measurable’ variables (Chai 2001, 
10-11).  
 Nevertheless, this theory has faced much criticism, both from the 
opponents and from the proponents. The latter have different points of view 
on which assumptions are possible and which are not. Hence, there are at 
least two types of interpretations of the theory, both of which have the 
common background concluded, according to Karl-Dieter Opp in the 
following propositions (Opp 1999, 173): 
1) Preference propositions: individual preferences (or goals) are 
conditions of behaviors which are instrumental in satisfying the 
respective preferences.  
2) Constraints propositions: anything that increases or decreases the 
possibilities of an individual to be able to satisfy her or his 
preferences by performing certain actions (i.e., opportunities or 
constraints) is a condition for performing these actions. 
3) Utility maximization proposition: individuals choose those actions 
that satisfy their preferences to the greatest extent, taking into 
account the constraints. 
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These core propositions have something in common with the 
‘rational optimization model’, presented by Chai as a cornerstone of the 
approach; however, Chai’s assumptions demonstrate a wider understanding 
of it.  
 For instance, his first assumption is based on the idea that every actor 
has some series of logical beliefs (either deterministic or not) about the 
outcomes of their actions. Thus, specification of the outcomes for each 
action depends on the type of beliefs: deterministic beliefs define just one 
single possible outcome conforming to condition of certainty, while 
nondeterministic ones imply either probabilities of various outcomes 
corresponding with condition of risk, or only assign some range of possible 
outcomes referring to condition of uncertainty. In that way, every outcome 
is a result of chosen actions and the existing state of environment, taking 
into account that nondeterministic beliefs emerge due to the fact that an 
actor has not enough knowledge about the environment or the choices of 
other actors (Chai 2001, 5). 
 Chai’s second assumption corresponds to Opp’s first proposition 
about preferences; moreover, Chai adds that these preferences are rated in a 
certain order which is specified by a utility function (Chai 2001, 6).  
 The final assumption about utility maximization is mentioned by 
both researchers, with the proviso by Chai that the type of belief affects on 
the variants of it: deterministic beliefs lead to choosing the actions which 
can bring the highest utility, probabilistic ones consequence in actions 
maximizing the expected utility, in the case of nondeterministic and 
nonprobabilistic beliefs the preferred action should prevail over all other 
actions “… that are believed to provide at least as much utility as all other 
actions under all possible states of the environment, provided such actions 
exist” (Chai 2001, 6). 
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  Nevertheless, Chai points out that although this optimization model 
has common assumptions making the foundation for rational choice 
approach, it is not enough to forecast the actions, as far as supposed 
preferences can be quite diverse (Chai 2001, 6). Hence, it is necessary to 
take into account some other assumptions recognized by rational choice 
theorists, which are different depending on whether it is narrow or wide 
understanding of the rationality.  
3.2.1 Narrow or external rational choice theory 
 
 According to K. Opp, there are five additional assumptions (Opp 
1999, 173-175):  
 First is that proponents of this interpretation of rational choice theory 
assume that there are only egoistic preferences which should be 
counted, thus, an individual is interested only is his or her own 
prosperity. 
 Secondly, by limiting possible preferences to explain the actions, the 
theorists consequently restrict the number of possible constraints up 
to only tangible ones. That is logical: in case when some preferences 
are excluded, a researcher, while explaining an action, has to avoid 
the events which are essential to satisfy these preferences, as far as 
they are not treated as relevant anymore.  
 According to the next assumption, which seems to be idealistic due 
to the fact that it is not perfectly possible in reality, but still is 
considered as useful tool in explanation of human behavior, an actor 
should be fully informed about his or her environment and about his 
or her own past and future behavior.  
 Following that assumption, the fourth one provides new restrictions 
of constraints, leaving only objective ones as relevant for explanation 
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of human behavior. Thus, subjective constraints are excluded from 
the narrow rational choice theory. 
 The final assumption here excludes preferences as an explanatory 
tool, despite the fact that they together with constraints are included 
due to the first three core assumptions of the rational choice theory. 
This is justified with the idea that in most cases preferences are 
stable and difficult to identify.  
 
These assumptions sound quite similar to what Fernando Aguiar and 
Andrés de Francisco call ‘externalist interpretation’ of rational choice 
theory. They argue that this approach is not more than descriptive theory 
when mental issues are not taken into account, and the theory is treated as 
an instrumental conception of the basic terms used for explanation (Aguiar 
& Francisco 2009, 550).  Emphasizing that reasons for action do not come 
from an individual, but rather they are external in theirs nature, the 
researchers refer to D. Satz and J. Ferejohn, who claim that reasoning is 
based on the parameters of the social structure within an actor interplays 
with others, namely the market, the family, the political party, social 
norms, the state, and so on (Satz and Ferejohn 1994, 77). 
3.2.2 Wide or internal rational choice theory 
  
 As far as K. Opp noted that assumptions of the narrow interpretation 
of rational choice theory are more specific, it makes it possible to claim, 
that the corresponding assumptions of the wide interpretation include the 
ones of the former. Hence, the assumptions are as follows (Opp 1999, 173-
175): 
 The proponents of this version admit that it is possible not to limit 
the preferences to the egoistic ones, thus, they include even altruism 
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as a possible factor for explanation of human behavior. Due to the 
different societies and different historical period the diversity of 
human preferences occurs, hence, in order to explain the whole array 
of human actions, it is necessary to recognize all kinds of 
preferences.  
 Following the first assumption of the wide interpretation, it becomes 
necessary to admit that all the constraints also can govern the human 
behavior.  
 As for the assumption about information, the theorists claim that it is 
not necessarily for an actor to be fully informed; still limited 
cognitive capabilities must not be neglected, so they are considered 
explicitly.  
 Due to the previous assumption, the advocates of the wide version 
recognize the relevance of both objective and perceived constraints, 
because by omitting the latter it increases the probability that the 
explanation will have some lack.   
 And finally, it is argued that human behavior may be explained by 
means of preferences, or constraints, or even both of them, but this 
choice depends on empirical data.  
 
 These assumptions conceptually correspond to the internalist 
interpretation, introduced by F. Aguiar & A. Francisco, making rational 
choice theory not only instrumental, but also normative (Aguiar & 
Francisco 2009, 549; Hausman 2001, 320; Landa 2004). This becomes 
possible, because the “internalists” claim that preferences, beliefs, and 
desires provide reasons for action, thus, referring to the third core 
assumption of utility maximization, this help to justify the decisions as the 
most beneficial for the actor (Aguiar & Francisco 2009, 549; Davidson 
1980, 21; Elster 1989, 25). Also R. Boudon notes, that reasoning does not 
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come from the outside, like externalists claim that, but they are formulated 
in the mind of individuals (Boudon 2003, 3).  
 Although these two kinds of interpretations of rational choice theory 
are competitive, it is not rare that both provide the same results, and hence, 
the critique appeals to the whole theory, highlighting its weak points.  
3.2.3 Critique of the rational choice theory 
 
 The rational choice theory is criticized from two standpoints: the first 
one includes debates on the very notion of rationality, while the second one 
covers issues of explanatory weakness. 
 The first group of critics fairly insists, that individuals are not always 
pragmatic in their actions, as M.D. McCubbins and M.F. Thies, M. F. 
clarify that human behavior is not often aimed in pleasure or ultimate 
profits (Mccubbins & Thies 1996, 3). This can be confirmed with public 
opinion surveys, experiments, and ethnographies, which affirm that display 
of altruism, expressive desires, and sense of justice is not rare (Chai 2001, 
13). Also political scientists emphasize that explanation from the rational 
perspective is not effective while applying it to collective political behavior 
and altruism (Green and Shapiro, 1994; Monroe, 1996). 
 Another reproof arises from empirical literature in social phycology, 
which undermines non-emotional nature of preferences: highlighting that 
decision-making process is not the same as optimization; likewise the 
evaluation of information turns out to be very diverging from the rational 
theory understanding putting emotions as an inalienable factor (Kahneman, 
Slovic, and Tversky, 1982; Nisbett and Ross, 1980; Chai 2001). 
 From the perspective of cultural scientists, rational choice theory 
lacks importance of culture and ideology presented in traditions, 
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institutions, habits, or societally imposed norms, as far as decision-making 
process based on the actors’ believes about their environment is lead not 
only out of information, but also is influenced with the aforementioned 
factors (Almond, 1991; Barber, 1984; Eckstein, 1991; Mansbridge, 1980). 
 Finally, rational choice theory is criticized for the assumption that 
the actors have to be fully informed, which is corrected in the narrow 
version, according to which the idea of ‘bounded rationality’ is also 
recognized. This idea was suggested by Herbert Simon, who argued that 
cognitive abilities are not infinite, and decisions are often based on random 
relevant facts and information, hence it is a process, not outcome, is 
emphasized. Also, it implies search for a satisfactory alternative which may 
cover only some requirements of an actor. Moreover, it is noted, that in 
order to predict an actor’s behavior, it is necessary to take into account 
some cognitive factors, which may include cultural aspects as well (Simon 
1995, 99-118).  
 As for the second group of critics, they point out that rational choice 
theory does not make any empirical contribution in political sciences, as far 
as its variables are not easy to evaluate or test. Moreover, it is emphasized 
that methodologically the theory is not strong enough (Green & Shapiro 
1994, 247-250). Although, there were some attempts to fill up this 
drawback, which concluded in growing use of complex mathematical 
models (Snidal 2002, 77; Chai 2001, 18), this approach did not met much 
appreciation.  
3.3 Conclusions to the chapter 
 
 In this chapter the phenomenon of pragmatic decisions was 
examined from the standpoint of rational choice theory. In spite the fact 
that there are several interpretations of the theory, it is assumed that every 
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actor has a set of preferences and constraints, or preferences and beliefs 
generated from the knowledge about the environment, which are used as 
instrumental tools in decision making process for maximization of personal 
utility. Hence, each actor always makes decisions in favor of pragmatic 
actions, and never to the detriment of him or herself.  
 Yet, the proponents of different interpretations have some 
contradictions about what can affect the decision making process: the 
theorist of the narrow or external version insist that reasoning is purely 
objective process, while the advocates of the wide or internal version 
assume that reasoning is a matter of human mind, so some perceived 
constraints cannot be neglected.  
 Nevertheless, critics of rational choice theory appeal to both types of 
theorists claiming that human behavior is not always pragmatic, that people 
often sacrifice themselves for something out of their interest and for the 
good of someone else. These remarks allows the political leaders to convict 
their opponents in being non-pragmatic, so rational choice theory becomes 
here a basis for political rhetoric, by means of which it becomes possible to 
claim for acting rationally. Hence, the critique of the empirical emptiness 
of the theory is not significant in this thesis, as far as critical approach to 
the rational choice theory shows how it works on the rhetorical level.  
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4. Methodology  
 
 The analysis of the research materials unfolded so that I sought to 
identify pragmatizing markers in them. This had necessitated me to first 
construct an analytical model with the help of which it was possible to go 
through the research materials and to recognize instances of pragmatization 
in them. This chapter explicates what I have in mind with pragmatizing 
markers and how they are used to identify these pragmatizing markers. 
4.1 Practical Syllogism as a Mechanism of Pragmatization 
 
 Examining actors’ rhetoric allows us to understand their perceptions, 
which in their turn have an impact to their actions, including foreign policy 
actions. This idea of influence has deep roots in the ancient philosophy, 
particularly, in Aristotle's works.   
 His doctrine of practical syllogism has caused pretty much of debate 
in scientific circles: some researchers criticize it, other seek for new 
interpretations etc. As for this thesis, it is used as a methodological 
guideline as it can help to figure out and fill up the gaps of rational choice 
theory and to identify instances of pragmatization in the research materials.   
 The structure of practical syllogism was accurately shown by an 
Austrian philosopher Hans Kelsen in his essay On Practical Syllogism, 
where he compared it to theoretical syllogism, which is a logical inference 
of statements presented in major and minor premises, and a conclusion. In 
the case of practical syllogism, one deals with imperatives, when it comes 
to the major premise and the conclusion, for instance (Kelsen 1973, 257): 
The major: Love your enemies; 
The minor: Jones is the enemy of Smith; 
And the conclusion: Smith is to love Jones 
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 Kelsen has a critical opinion claiming that this syllogism “is not 
logically possible” due to the fact that imperatives cannot be true or false, 
unlike the statements, which sets the problem with derivation of validity of 
individual imperative from the general one (Kelsen 1973, 257-258). 
 Nevertheless, the solution to this puzzle was found by a Finish 
philosopher Georg Henric von Wright. He also admits, that practical 
syllogism cannot be evidential, as he believes that the character of logical 
consequence is omitted in the connection between the premises and the 
conclusion. However, in his opinion, only after the action has occurred, the 
practical thinking becomes logically evident, so this thinking is built in 
order to understand and confirm this act (Wright 1986, 147).  
 Following this idea, there is a necessity to find a cause of an action in 
order to understand it. Scottish historian of philosophy Alexander Broadie 
put it this way:  
… we cannot claim fully to understand an action if we do not know 
the premises which express its cause. That is, we do not understand 
an action if we do not know why it was performed-what the agent's 
motives were, the way he saw his situation, etc. (Broadie 1968, 27).  
  
As researchers, we pursue this very aim; moreover, we analyze the 
conclusions, which have already become a history. Hence, it seems to be 
possible to build a structure of practical syllogism for pragmatic foreign 
policy decisions, which will look like this: 
 
The major: Be pragmatic!; 
The minor: This decision sounds rational and pragmatic; 
And the conclusion: Politicians are to make this decision. 
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 Thus, practical syllogism can be used as the mechanism of 
pragmatization: the major premise is installed from the clash of societies, 
which was mentioned in the theoretical chapter, so one actor appeals to 
another one claiming ‘be pragmatic!’. As for the minor premise and the 
conclusion, it is necessary to run a few steps forward. The analysis of 
empirical materials showed, that the actors apply some rhetorical tools, 
which I call ‘pragmatizing markers’, I have found five of them: profit, right 
and thought, institutionalism, humanism, and ideal speech situation; a more 
detailed explanation will be present further. These markers are realized by 
actors with different figures of speech, which are based on the concept of 
its pragmatizing marker.  
 Hence, practical syllogism is a mechanism, with the help of which 
pragmatizing markers work. Moreover, they can work differently:  
implicitly, when they serve as the second premise, or explicitly, when the 
marker is the action. In the latter case the action is often supported by 
another pragmatizing marker, which is put as the second premise again.  
 However, the tricky moment here was highlighted by German-
British philosopher  Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller: taking into 
consideration, that actions are the conclusions of practical syllogisms, he 
points out: “This applies to all acts alike, reflective or impulsive, good, bad, 
or indifferent” (Schiller 1917, 650). This point contradicts to the rational 
choice theory, because not every act can be rational and pragmatic, 
especially when it comes to impulsiveness. On the other hand, we will be 
faced with some mechanisms of pragmatization, which have a cause of 
emotional character, but still they are concluded in rational actions. 
 It seems possible to me that, as Alexander Broadie has explained it,  
… any action has an internal and an external aspect. The latter, 
which is the physical aspect, is the matter of the action, and the 
former, constituted by the agent's motives, intentions, beliefs, etc., 
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which are expressed as the premises of the practical syllogism, is the 
form of the action. As the form of the action, the premises express 
the rational structure of the action which is their conclusion. And the 
matter is that which has this rational structure (Broadie 1968, 27). 
  
 This way, it can be claimed, that doctrine of practical syllogism helps 
to figure out the mechanisms of pragmatization in cases where rational 
choice theory does not work. As will be discussed further, the syllogism 
forms a basis for several mechanisms. The hint how to find these 
mechanisms is also present in the researches on practical syllogism. For 
instance, a British classicist, philosopher and academic  William Francis 
Ross Hardie mentioned in his book Aristotle's Ethical Theory, that it is 
necessary to use some evaluative (‘good’, ‘useful’) or prescriptive words 
(‘should’, ‘ought’) to express the syllogism verbally (Hardie 1968). 
 This idea pushes towards applying rhetorical analysis, moreover, 
coming back to Aristotle, in his treatise Rhetoric the philosopher points out 
that the use of language, namely style, is one of three basic points to make 
a persuasive speech. Interestingly enough, the Greek philosopher alleges 
that the very function of rhetoric consists in disclosing the accessible tools 
of persuasion, but not a persuasion itself. There is a perceptible tendency to 
understand the concept of rhetoric this way in most of the recent researches 
devoted to this topic, particularly, in the field of Political Studies (Aristotle 
n.d.).   
4.2 Rhetorical Political Analysis 
 
 Rhetorical analysis provides a set of tools for the identification of 
pragmatizing markers. Susan Condor, Cristian Tileagă, and Michael Billig 
made an immense overview for The Oxford Handbook of Political 
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Psychology, where they highlighted recently published works which 
covered the topic of political rhetoric. Among these works, they mention 
Gill and Whedbee’s contribution claiming that “the essential activities of 
rhetoric are located on a political stage” (Gill and Whedbee 1997, 157). 
This makes sense in the context of this research also: owing to the 
development of mass media and broadening of the target audience the role 
of political rhetoric becomes more multitask, which makes the topic 
extremely interesting to researchers. 
 Hence, it is necessary to designate the basic objectives of rhetorical 
political analysis. Referring to Alan Finlayson, three basic principles can be 
figured out, which a researcher should follow while analyzing the rhetoric 
of politicians. Firstly, the approach considers every single political debate 
regarding its original rhetorical context, in brief words, texts within 
‘rhetorical situation’ (Finlayson 2007, 554). Second point of concern is 
argumentative establishment of the topic, which includes the following: 
whether the case reflects actual state of affairs (conjecture), how it is called 
(definition), assessment of case (quality), and the boundaries of legitimate 
argument (place) (Finlayson 2007, 554-555). Thirdly, it is important to 
analyze the actual essence of political argument, which covers the problem 
of framing the policy in terms of universal and particular; the formulation 
by means of metaphors, narrative sequencing, and other figures of speech; 
appeal to ethos, pathos, or logos; genre; connection with general 
ideological or party political commitments (Finlayson 2007, 555-559). 
 However, most of the researchers, who work with empirical analysis, 
draw a special attention to so-called micro-features of communication, 
which can be united in a group of figures of speech. In linguistics this 
interest is explained with the idea, that these figures have a special rhetoric 
impact. For instance, British linguist John Earl Joseph, who has researched 
the effect of word choice (such as racial epithets and generally deprecatory 
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words) in political discourse, points out that there are other ways of making 
rhetorical effect: “… word order and sentence construction are another 
powerful means, as are repetition, rhythm, and all the other classic tropes 
that make for effective style” (Joseph 2006, 112).  
 As for political science, Condor, Tileagă and Billig  note the 
following issues which have been scrutinized by contemporary researchers: 
use of metaphors (Ferrari, 2007), proverbs (Orwenjo, 2009), slogans 
(Kephart & Rafferty, 2009), humor (Dmitriev, 2008 ; Timmerman, 
Gussman, and King, 2012 ), politeness (Fracchiolla, 2011 ; Shibamoto-
Smith, 2011), and appeals to common sense values such as “change” (Roan 
& White, 2010), “choice” (Gaard, 2010), and “community” (Buckler, 
2007) in political talk and texts (Condor et al. 2013, 267). 
  As far as my research question concerns not the full interpretation of 
the cases, but figuring out the means of pragmatization the political 
discourse, I will concentrate here on the figures of speech, which serve this 
very purpose.  
4.2.1 Use of Metaphors in International Relations Studies 
 
 Among figures of speech, the metaphor seems to be the most popular 
in International Relations studies, as the vast majority of rhetorical analyses 
are devoted to it. And it is not surprising, because in this field one has to 
deal with the phenomena of abstract nature, which might provide some 
problems with understanding, while metaphors can help to give these 
concepts a concrete form.  
 This function of the classical trope was thoroughly investigated by 
American linguists George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, who claim that 
metaphorical definition in conceptual system resolves the problem by 
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replacing abstract concepts, such as emotions, ideas, or time, with the other 
ones, which can be clearly understood, like spatial orientations, objects, etc. 
(Lakoff and Johnson 2003, 116). Moreover, they insist, that metaphors are 
“…essential to human understanding and as a mechanism for creating new 
meaning and new realities in our lives” (Lakoff and Johnson 2003, 147). 
This statement also underlines the possibility of some metaphors to become 
an objective fact in theoretical framework. For instance, an American 
professor of politics Michael P. Marks brings the metaphor of ‘anarchy’ as 
an example, calling it “the most fundamental metaphor in contemporary 
international relations theory” (Marks 2011, 188).  
 Touching upon the role of metaphors in International Relations it 
should be mentioned that the pioneer in this field is Eugene Miller, 
professor emeritus of political science at the University of Georgia, whose 
article in the American Political Science Review in 1979 set up the 
approaches for using metaphors in Political Science Analysis. There are 
three of these approaches: verificationist view, constitutivist view and 
manifestationist view.  
 The verificationist view implies, that a metaphor is just a hypothesis, 
unless it is verified with the actual political events, in other case it would be 
just useless (Miller 1979, 158). Applying to the constitutivist view, Miller 
explains:  
For the constitutivist metaphors are neither linguistic 
ornaments to be viewed with suspicion nor heuristic devices to 
be discarded once objects are known. They are indispensable 
components of language and - since thought depends on 
language - indispensable components of thought as well 
(Miller 1979, 161). 
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 The last approach, which was called the manifestationist view, is 
considered as a tool of disclosing political reality by manifesting their 
intelligible structure (Miller 1979, 162).  
4.2.2 Other Figures of Speech: Pragmatizing Markers 
  
 Despite the fact that metaphors play an important role in 
International Relations, analysis of my empirical materials showed that its 
use is not as widespread as it might seem. That is why I decided to unite 
together all figures of speech, which make foreign policy decisions sound 
pragmatic, and call them ‘pragmatizing markers’ for more convenience. 
 Hence, five groups of pragmatizing markers were found. The first 
group covers variants of profitable decisions, which suit the requirements 
of rational choice theory.  
 The second group reflects the structure of practical syllogism, and 
covers the figures of the following concepts: right, well-considered, wise 
and prudent. This means that an actor argues that he or she has weighed all 
pros and cons, evaluated all possible benefits and losses, put aside 
emotions, which has resulted in this very decision, which according to the 
structure of practical syllogism, is performed as pragmatic one.  
 Nevertheless, there are some cases, which formally do not fit the 
concept of rationality, but still, the decisions are presented as pragmatic and 
rational. Hence, it is necessary to also look at the emotional component of 
rational choice theory, which turned out to be possible. Traditionally 
rational choice theory skips emotions, in spite of the cases, according to 
Jon Elster, a Norwegian social and political theorist, when they can bring 
any pleasure, satisfaction, and utility (Elster 1996, 1386). Thus, is it 
possible, that idea of ending a bloodshed or reverent attitude towards such 
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institutional value as legitimacy and obedience of international law can 
bring some pleasure, satisfaction, or utility to the decision-makers? Still it 
sounds not persuasive enough, in my opinion. From this standpoint, in is 
interesting to acquaint oneself with Rose McDermott’s research, where she 
claims that emotion is inseparable constituent of rationality (McDermott 
2004, 700). 
 McDermott (2004, 700-701) has built a model of emotional 
rationality, which includes ten “cognitive truths”:  
1) Due to emotions an individual acts with regard to an imagined or 
experienced event.  
2) A decision maker’s expected utility calculation includes his or her 
expected emotional state. 
3) Immediate and anticipatory emotion can affect on evaluating a supposed 
success of decision makers’ actions by increasing the perceived discount of 
future payoffs. 
4) Emotion allows decision makers to focus on certain important 
information that may not be otherwise accessible. 
5) Mood can affect the selection of memory. 
6) Mood can affect the selection of historical analogies. 
7) Emotion can affect risk perception. 
8) Emotional pathways in the brain increase the speed and often the 
accuracy of judgment and decision making. 
9) Specific emotions may predictably bias particular decision makers, or 
bias decision makers toward specific decisions. 
10) Emotion can form premonition.  
 McDermott argues that this model will supplement existing models 
of rational choice with empirical and descriptive value (McDermott 2004, 
698), which sounds quite reasonable, although, some points remains 
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questionable in terms of rational choice theory. Nevertheless, it explains 
why the foregoing cases can be assessed as pragmatic decisions. In 
particular, if emotions make decision makers to act concerning an imagined 
or experienced event, moreover, including affected selection of memory 
and historical analogies, it is possible to admit, that such decisions are 
rational and pragmatic. This is because the notorious consequences of 
certain experience may prevent an actor from possible losses, which have 
to be minimalized with regard to rational choice theory. Moreover, risk 
perception, which is stimulated with emotions, will serve the same aim: to 
avoid losses. In this sense, when an actor prefers to suit the norms of 
International Law and supports an idea to stop bloodshed on a territory of 
the potential partner, his or her decisions are, surely, dictated by emotions, 
but still pursue the goal to minimize losses, which sounds pragmatic. In 
addition, a belief of saving lives might bring happiness, pleasure, and 
satisfaction, which also fulfils the requirements of rational choice theory, 
which has been already mentioned.  
 Thus, it seems reasonable to define two pragmatizing markers based 
on emotional rationality. As the variation of these markers is quite wide, I 
have decided to unite them in two concepts: ‘institutionalism’ for 
legitimization of power, following norms of International Law and other 
international agreements; and ‘humanism’ for avoiding human losses, 
ending bloodshed and violence, and so on.  
  The last group of pragmatizing markers demands referring to a well-
known model of Ideal Speech Situation designed by German philosopher 
and sociologist Jürgen Habermas. According to this model, a rational 
consensus is brought out of a conversation, or let me call it dialogue, when 
the participants are equal (meaning that everyone has a chance to speak), 
they talk sincerely, do not lie, and focused on mutual understanding 
(Habermas 1984, 264). Of course, this model got much of criticism for 
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ambiguity of the concept of truth, but my point here is that rationality is 
impossible without a dialogue. It follows from this, that a side, which 
claims for a dialogue and negotiations, performs itself as a rational actor 
seeking pragmatic resolution, while a refusing side is estimated as not 
rational actor, which fails his or her pragmatic intentions.  
 Hence, I chose to include a pragmatizing marker of ‘Ideal Speech 
Situation’ (further ‘ISS’), which includes figures of ‘dialogue’, or by 
contrast, showing the fail of the Ideal Speech Situation, such as ‘no 
response’. 
 Overall, the analysis revealed, that there are five groups of 
pragmatizing markers, which were used by Russian and German political 
leaders in three cases. These markers can be called as ‘profit’, ‘right and 
thought’, ‘institutionalism’, ‘humanism’, and finally, ‘ISS’.  
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5. Analysis of pragmatizing markers in speeches of political 
leaders in Russia and Germany  
 
 This chapter presents an analysis of the examples of using 
pragmatizing markers in speeches of Russian and German political leaders. 
While looking for pragmatizing markers it is necessary to apply the 
mechanism of practical syllogism, so that it would be clear what figures of 
speech represent the markers, which make the foreign policy rhetoric sound 
pragmatic. Before presenting the analysis as such, I will explicate how the 
research materials were collected and selected. 
5.1. Time Framing and Data Collecting 
 
 The timeframe for this thesis was set up in accordance with the time 
period of the chosen cases and data available, as the result, the period for 
the research covers the years 2005 – 2015.  
 Data includes interviews, press-conferences, and official reports of 
political leaders of Russia and Germany during the time period indicated 
above, which can give a diverse image of pragmatizing markers used in 
their rhetoric. These data was collected from official web-sites of the 
president of the Russian Federation (further: the RF President), Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (the MFA), The Chancellor of 
the Federal Republic of Germany (the FRG Ch.), and The Federal Foreign 
Office of Germany (the FFO). I refused the idea of looking for the 
materials in the sphere of mass media, because the transcripts of the 
interviews with leading online media publications are presented on the 
previously mentioned sources, moreover, I believe, this will not undermine 
the reliability of the information. 
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 As all the sites mentioned has a keyword search tool, I tried to look 
up for the necessary materials using it, however, it turned out to work 
properly only on the web-site of the president of the Russian Federation. 
Nevertheless, my idea of searching by keywords, which  represent the 
markers of pragmatization (such as beneficial, or emotional), had failed due 
to the numerous pages which did not correspond to the cases I was going to 
analyze, also, this way had omitted variations of the words and phrases, 
which might signalize pragmatization. So, I changed the keywords 
replacing them with the names of my cases (such as Nord Stream, 
Syria/Syrian, and Ukraine/Ukrainian), then diminished the results of the 
search in accordance with the timeframe, and subsequently I scanned them 
for the markers of pragmatization, which should consider, as I believe, a 
concept of benefit, or being well-thought omitting emotions, and so far.  
 The other sites either showed no results, or gave just one or two of 
them, which barely suited my topic. So, I had to look up to the reports and 
transcripts in the archives of the sites, which had made my work easier due 
to the yearly assortment. Here the materials were chosen also on the basis 
of the topic and occurrence of potential markers of pragmatization.  
 Hence, I have looked through 58 transcripts from the RF President’s 
site, 37 – the MFA, 42 – the FRG Ch., and 49 – the FFO, all together – 186 
transcripts, but unfortunately, only 27 statements contain pragmatizing 
markers, which were expressed by means of 45 figures of speech. Overall 
these data can illustrate how Russian and German political leaders make 
their decisions sound pragmatic.   
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5.2 Analysis of the Nord Stream Pipeline: Cooperation 
5.2.1 Russia 
 The discussions on the high level about the project of Nord Stream 
Pipeline started from the year when its consortium was established, 2005. 
At the joint Russian-German statement on energy cooperation made by 
President Putin and Federal Chancellor Schroeder from the 8
th
 of 
September it was mentioned, that: 
1. On this basis Russia and Germany propose to strengthen their 
relations in the field of energy in the spirit of long-term strategic 
energy partnership for the good of both countries and the whole 
Europe (Putin 2005). 
In this case, President Putin uses the figure ‘for the good’, which suits the 
group of pragmatizing markers of profit, to confirm the pragmatic nature of 
the decision to support this project. Interestingly enough, it is highlighted 
that this cooperation is beneficial not only for Russia, but also for Germany 
‘and the whole Europe’. This is a proposition for the other actors also to 
become a part of this project if they are pursuing pragmatic goals. From the 
perspective of practical syllogism, thus, this figure of speech works as the 
second premise, which should be a statement as it is. Hence, the conclusion 
of the syllogism that is to be an imperative is represented by the claim for 
strengthening energy relations through participation in the project, which is 
treated as pragmatic action. This idea is supported by the further claim, that 
2. For both countries it is profitable to cooperate deeply in the field of 
energy sources upstream and downstream (Putin 2005). 
This example illustrates the use of figure of speech ‘profitable’, which also 
corresponds directly to the group of profit.  
 Thus, the process of constructing the pipeline was also followed with 
political statements. For instance, at the ceremony devoted to the start of 
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building the maritime part of the gas pipeline Nord Stream which was held 
on the 9
th
 of April 2010, President Medvedev claimed: 
3. And this cooperation has stood the test of time completely. I am sure, 
it shows very good mutual results, and provide more than a quarter 
of total volume of the gas consumed by the European Union. This 
makes approximately 140 billion cubic meters per year (Medvedev 
2010a).  
 Although this example seems quite vague at the first glance, 
nevertheless, it also contains the pragmatizing marker of profit, which is 
reflected in figure ‘very good mutual results’. It is supported by further 
words and numbers: ‘a quarter of total volume of the gas consumed’ and 
‘140 billion cubic meters per year’. Reconstructing this example in terms of 
retroactive practical syllogism the following is concluded: since the actor 
supplies the other side of the project with impressive amount of the fuel 
and avoids possible losses in transit zones, it has received significant 
benefit from this cooperation, which corresponds with the second premise; 
hence, this action is assumed to be a pragmatic one. Thus, these figures 
indicate the profitable meaning of the words ‘very good mutual results’, 
which allows relating this figure of speech to pragmatizing marker of 
profit.  
 Later on, president Medvedev commented in the interview to the 
Danish broadcast corporation DR the following:  
4. This is a sign of good relations, partnership, which our countries 
have. I would like to remind, that Denmark was the first to agree for 
pipeline building through their territorial waters. And I think that it 
is a wise decision. Why? Because the pipeline is not the project, 
which only the Russian Federation needs, or, let us suppose, some 
other countries, which stand at the end of the gas pipeline, do. This 
is our common business, moreover, a profitable one (Medvedev 
2010b). 
 48 
 
According to this example an actor, Dmitri Medvedev, uses pragmatizing 
markers aiming to persuade that the Danish decision to give an agreement 
for pipeline building through its territorial waters was pragmatic. Hence, 
the actor uses two figures of speech: ‘wise’ and ‘profitable’. The latter 
belongs to the group of profit markers, which has been already examined in 
the second example, while the former is interesting in the sense that it 
represents the group of right and thought markers. In other words, the 
Danish decision is represented as a good and right thing to do. As I have 
mentioned in the methodology chapter, this group reconstructs the model of 
practical syllogism, which can be analyzed here in detail.  
 The first premise is the same for all the cases: actors should make 
pragmatic decisions; conclusion expressed in action is mentioned here: 
‘Denmark was the first to agree for pipeline building through their 
territorial waters’. According to the model, the second premise contains the 
pragmatizing marker, here it is represented with the figure of speech ‘wise’, 
which explicitly includes the process of thinking, weighing benefits and 
losses, and, finally, excluding emotional factor from the decision-making 
process. As far as these points suit the requirements of rational choice 
theory, the action is presented here as a pragmatic one, which is further 
strengthened with the marker of profit. 
5.2.2 Germany 
 Interestingly, the German actors seem to be not very active in using 
pragmatizing markers in the case of Nord Stream Pipeline. However, a 
couple of them were found in Chancellor Angela Merkel’s statement on the 
occasion of Nord Stream Pipeline start-up in Lubmin from the 8
th
 of 
November 2011:  
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5. As politicians, we are interested in reliable energy supplies, of 
course. The Nord Stream Pipeline, the second pipe strand of which 
will have been built soon, is a good pattern for this (Merkel 2011). 
 In this example it is also necessary to apply the model of practical 
syllogism to find out the marker. The second premise is hidden behind the 
words ‘interested in reliable energy supplies’, as consequence of which , an 
action, which is able to find a solution to the issue of reliability, is treated 
as profitable. The actor points out that this solution is the Nord Stream, 
underlining it with the figure of speech ‘a good pattern’, which matches up 
with the profit group of pragmatizing markers. 
 The following statement also contains an example of pragmatization, 
which is presented here: 
6. So, it can be said, that both importing countries and Russia profit 
from the pipeline (Merkel 2011). 
This example demonstrates the use of pragmatizing marker of profit, which 
is directly put into the figure of speech ‘profit’, similarly to the second 
example.  
 To sum up, the case of Nord Stream Pipeline project, which 
corresponds to the relations of cooperation between Russia and Germany, 
shows the use of pragmatizing markers of two groups: profit and right and 
thought. Unfortunately, there are not many examples, which were found, 
and the reason for that, as it seems to me, lies in the conditions of 
cooperation the participating actors do not have to persuade each other in 
rationality of their actions. However, the cooperating actor need to confirm 
other actors in the pragmatic nature of their decisions, this is where the 
pragmatizing markers appear. 
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5.3 Problematics of the Near East by Example of Syria: Different 
Points of View 
 If only a few cases of the use of pragmatizing markers were found in 
the speeches relating to the Nord Stream project, the situation is different in 
speeches on the conflict in Syria. In a condition of differing points of view, 
it is necessary for actors to sound persuasive, this is why, I suppose, 
rhetoric tools are used more actively. The example below will show that 
actors tend to apply a set of different pragmatizing markers at once.  
5.3.1 Russia 
 In the Interview with the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs S.V. 
Lavrov by the Reuters news agency from the 23
rd
 of December 2011 three 
speech figures are used: 
7. We have pointed it out several times, that it is necessary to keep to a 
peaceful way to fulfil the legal directing of the people of Near East 
and Northern Africa by means of broad national dialogue without 
any foreign interference. This approach fits into the standards of 
international law (Lavrov 2011a). 
This example presents two groups of markers: institutionalism by means of 
speech figures ‘legal directing’ and ‘standards of international law’, and 
ideal speech situation (ISS) embedded in the figure of ‘dialogue’. In the 
methodology chapter I have mentioned about emotional reasoning, when 
emotional decision based on some values is presented as rational one. Here 
the value of institutionalism comes to the first place as Lavrov argues that 
Russia is opposed to foreign interference into the Syrian conflict, which 
resulted in veto on the 4th of October 2011 in the UN Security Council. 
According to the possible pragmatism of institutionalism, the actor uses its 
pragmatizing markers, pursuing the goal to convince the others of the 
rationality of this choice. 
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 As for the ISS marker, dialogue is assumed as a pragmatic form of 
action in any situation. According to this idea, Lavrov uses the figure of 
speech ‘dialogue’ as the second premise of the syllogism, so in order to 
settle the conflict, it is necessary to start negotiations, and this action will 
be treated as pragmatic one. 
 The idea of the ISS as a pragmatic solution is present in many other 
statements as well. Sometimes it is mixed with other pragmatizing markers. 
For instance, in response to the question from Argumenty I Fakty 
newspaper on the subject of Syria, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs S. 
Lavrov noted:  
8. We do everything possible to stop the bloodshed, to set the sides to 
negotiate, when the Syrians themselves are to come to an agreement 
about the future political structure of their country (Lavrov 2012). 
By using the figure of speech ‘to set the sides to negotiate’ the actor 
appeals to the pragmatizing marker of the ISS, which again underlines that 
it is necessary to start dialogue in order to reach a pragmatic goal. This 
example also shows another marker from the group of humanism, which is 
expressed with the figure of speech ‘to stop the bloodshed’. As far as value 
of human life is possible to treat as pragmatic, this marker works as the 
second premise of syllogism, which is concluded in the action of claiming 
for negotiations. 
 Another example of using the ISS marker comes from the interview 
of Special Representative of the Russian President for the Middle East, 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia M. L. Bogdanov to RIA 
Novosti. Saying that the Geneva communique is a necessary condition to 
settle the conflict, he remarks: 
9. We have said that several times to our western partners, but our 
appeals have had no response yet (Bogdanov 2012). 
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The figure of speech ‘no response’ illustrates the crisis of the ISS, 
according to which the position of other actors who are reluctant to adopt 
the Geneva communique is considered as non-pragmatic. 
 As for pragmatizing marker of institutionalism, it is also repeated in 
other statements of the Russian political leaders. In the interview to the 
Interfax news agency M. Bogdanov condemns the western view on the 
situation in Syria: 
10. They keep talking obstinately, that regime in Damascus is 
illegitimate, that President Assad should step down, but we suppose, 
that such claims have no legal platform and do not advantage the 
cause (Bogdanov 2014). 
Here the actor, Mr. Bogdanov, underlines the non-pragmatic position of the 
other actors: firstly, the value of institutionalism, which is considered 
pragmatic, is undermined, thus the figure of speech ‘no legal platform’ is 
used; secondly, the idea of a non-pragmatic decision is supported with the 
marker of profit, which is represented here with the help of figure 
‘advantage’.  
 A similar situation was found in the interview of M. Bogdanov to 
RIA Novosti, which was already mentioned in the example 9. 
11. At this stage it is necessary to get the most useful benefit of existing 
international legal framework for the settlement of the Syrian issue. 
It is based on the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, in 
particular in resolutions 2042 and 2043, as well as in the Geneva 
document, and contains a set of powerful tools to stop the violence 
and start peaceful negotiations. Losing this basis would be unwise. 
(Bogdanov 2012).  
In this statement the idea of institutionalism is supported with two other 
pragmatizing markers. First, there is a marker of profit enclosed to the 
figure of speech ‘to get the most useful benefit’. By using this, the model of 
practical syllogism is restored: the first premise is always the same, which 
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is imperative ‘be pragmatic’; the second premise contains the pragmatizing 
marker of benefit, so the statement ‘it is necessary to get the most useful 
benefit of existing international legal framework for the settlement of the 
Syrian issue’ indicates that the action, when ‘the relevant UN Security 
Council resolutions, in particular in resolutions 2042 and 2043, as well as 
in the Geneva document’ come into force, will be a pragmatic one. 
Moreover, there is another supporting marker, of right and thought, with 
the help of which the actor highlights the pragmatism of the decision to 
appeal to the international legal framework. Mr. Bogdanov uses the figure 
of speech ‘would be unwise’, emphasizing that the opponents are not 
pragmatic in their decisions.  
 One more example of using a pragmatizing marker is performed in 
the interview with S. Lavrov by Interfax agency from the 26
th
 of December 
2011: 
12. We are ready for further partnership with the states of the region on 
the basis of equality and mutual benefit with full respect to their 
traditions, history, and culture (Lavrov 2011b) 
Using the figure of speech ‘mutual benefit’ the actor emphasizes 
pragmatism of further partnership. Unlike the previous examples, where the 
pragmatizing marker of profit is used, it is applied solely here. This can be 
explained with the idea that this example illustrates the Russian position 
towards the cooperation with the Near East states, in particular with Syria, 
while the previous examples showed the claim for the other actors to act 
pragmatically.  
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5.3.2 Germany 
 My analysis shows that the German point of view on the situation in 
Syria is totally different from the Russian one, but still the German leaders 
claim for their opponents to choose pragmatic decisions. In a press release 
“Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle condemns the violence against the 
demonstrators in Syria” from the 19th of March 2011 it was mentioned that: 
13. In order to avoid further escalation, all the representatives of 
political power especially the Government should act responsibly 
and seek for a dialogue (Westerwelle 2011a). 
Claiming for settlement of the conflict, the actor uses the figure of speech 
‘seek for dialogue’, which – as was mentioned previously – corresponds to 
the pragmatizing marker of ISS. It is quite remarkable, that G. Westerwelle 
appeals to ‘all the representatives of power’ to start negotiations, which 
suits the requirement of the ISS meaning equality of the actors, so that each 
can have a word.  
 Nevertheless, there is another example of using ISS marker marks, 
with the help of which the actor points out non-pragmatic position of 
President Assad:  
14. We appeal to President Assad to change his radical course. The 
problems of the Syrians can be solved only in the way of dialogue 
and plausible reforms, but not with the help of violence (Westerwelle 
2011b). 
Here the actor sets a pragmatic solution using figure of speech ‘dialogue’ 
against the chosen path of violence. In other words, the path of violence 
chosen by Assad is designated as radical, as a result of which, it is 
relegated to the category of non-pragmatic decisions. The juxtaposition of 
the ISS to violence thus serves to highlight the character of the former as a 
pragmatic path.  
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 A month later the German Foreign Minister G. Westerwelle claimed 
the following: 
15. The regime must finally end its brutal course and respond to the 
legitimate demands of the opposition. Only on this basis a valid 
national dialogue is possible that must lead to genuine democracy 
and political participation (Westerwelle 2011c). 
Again the figure ‘dialogue’ is used here with addition of pragmatizing 
marker of institutionalism. As far as the German position is based on the 
idea that Assad’s presidency is not legitimate, so they support the 
opposition, which is considered as pragmatic decision, hence the actor uses 
the figure of speech ‘legitimate demands’ to emphasize this.  
 Continuing this idea, the German Foreign Minister claims the 
following: 
16. The Federal Government demands the president Assad to stop 
violence against the peaceful demonstrators immediately. Only 
immediate change and significant dialogue with the will to change 
can stop the further bloodshed (Westerwelle 2011d). 
In this example the idea of ISS formulated in the figure of ‘dialogue’ is 
supported with the pragmatizing marker of humanism, as the actor uses the 
figure ‘stop further bloodshed’. This combination of markers again reminds 
of the model of practical syllogism, where the action the German 
government must demand Assad to ‘stop the further bloodshed’ is 
concluded from the second premise of ‘dialogue’: violence is unacceptable, 
instead of dialogue Assad is using violence against peaceful demonstrators, 
the German Government must thus demand Assad to stop bloodshed.  
 In 2012 Germany expelled its Syrian ambassador, which was 
followed with this statement: 
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17. We are confident that our clear and firm message will not fall on 
deaf ears in Damascus (Westerwelle 2011e). 
This metaphorical figure ‘will not fall on deaf ears’ used by G. Westerwelle 
corresponds to the situation of the crisis of ISS, which the actor tries to 
avoid. Since the ISS is pragmatic, the actor who seeks for a dialogue makes 
a pragmatic decision, while the ‘deaf’ interlocutor’s actions do not fit this 
request. This example can be also examined as an attempt to use 
pragmatization to appeal to the Assad regime: Westerwelle’s utterance 
follows the logic of “our message is clear and firm, if the Assad 
government is pragmatic, it will listen to our message”. While the idea of 
Damascus being pragmatic is not explicitly given in the passage, it is 
possible to reconstruct it using the syllogism.  
5.4 Ukrainian Crisis: conflict 
 As in the conditions of different points of view, the situation of the 
Ukrainian conflict pushes the actors to increase the use of pragmatic 
markers, as far as they have to confirm that their decisions are right, and 
consequently pragmatic, while the opponent’s position is not.  
5.4.1 Russia 
 The strategy of using rhetorical tools by Russian political leader has 
changed through the crisis: at the beginning it was expressed with negative 
use of pragmatizing markers in order to show, that the western position was 
non-pragmatic. It is clear from the president Putin's response to the 
journalists' questions on the situation in Ukraine from the 4
th
 of March 
2014, which turned out to be quite a fruitful source of pragmatizing 
markers, for instance: 
18. They supported an unconstitutional armed take-over, declared these 
people legitimate and are trying to support them. By the way, despite 
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all of this we have been patient and even ready to cooperate; we do 
not want to disrupt our cooperation (Putin 2014a). 
In this example the actor uses three pragmatizing markers: of 
institutionalism, of right and thought, and of ISS. Firstly, the actor opposes 
Russian position on take-over against the western one, treating the coup 
d’état as non-pragmatic action, as it undermines the value of 
institutionalism, putting it into the figure 'unconstitutional', nevertheless, he 
notes, that from the Western side it is not like this, because they claim that 
people at power in Ukraine are 'legitimate', and this figure of speech 
corresponds to the group of pragmatizing markers of institutionalism.  
 Emphasizing on the pragmatic nature of the Russian decisions, the 
following figure 'patient', gives a hint that actions are taken without 
emotional influence, they are well-considered and mature. And the final 
confirmation in this statement strengthens it, when the actor uses the figure 
of speech 'ready to cooperate’, which I consider as a claim for ISS, 
underlining that Russia is open for a dialogue. The cooperative policy is 
pragmatized with reference to the idea of Russia as a patient and mature 
political actor in world politics. 
 Further on, the situation is repeated: 
19. Did our partners in the West and those who call themselves the 
government in Kiev now not foresee that events would take this turn? 
I said to them over and over: Why are you whipping the country into 
a frenzy like this? What are you doing? But they keep on pushing 
forward (Putin 2014a).  
This is an interesting statement as it represents the crisis of ISS, which, at 
the same time, is supported with negative use of pragmatizing marker of 
right and thought. The Russian position is pragmatized by way of 
contrasting it to the non-pragmatic Western position: the passage suggests 
that the West is pushing Ukraine to frenzy and as Ukraine should not be 
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pushed to frenzy, Russia chooses to act differently from the West. 
Moreover, here President Putin points out that the Western partners are not 
pragmatic, because they ‘did not foresee’ the consequences of their 
decisions. If they were pragmatic, they should have thought more 
thoroughly about this issue and been more careful in choosing their 
position. So, this negative use of the pragmatizing marker of right and 
thought emphasizes the contrast of the Western and Russian decisions, 
introducing the former as non-pragmatic actor.  
 President Putin remarks, that the Western position towards the state 
of affairs in Ukraine is wrong, as far as their actions resulted in something, 
which brings nothing good, and here he uses the figure of speech 'whipping 
into a frenzy', which contradicts to the pragmatic nature. Next figure is 
'keep on pushing forward', which indicates that the western actors gave no 
response to the Russian warnings, which also represent them as non-
pragmatic actors, as far as ISS did not occur. 
A month later the situation has changed, as far as the Russian side stopped 
accusing the western actors of being non-pragmatic, and took an aim at 
confirming the others in pragmatism of Russian actions. For instance, on 
the 11
th
 of April 2014 the meeting of the Russian Security Council was 
held, where the president claimed the following:  
20. Russia is being very careful in its action and is taking a very 
balanced and respectful line towards all of our partners (Putin 
2014b). 
In this example the actor applies pragmatizing markers of right and thought 
by using figures 'careful in action' and 'balanced line'. This highlights that 
the decision-making process was long enough to get rid of emotions end 
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weight all the possible benefits and losses of the actions with the cool 
mind. The president keeps on this strategy even further. 
 At the annual big press conference with the Russian president, which 
was held on the 18
th
 of December 2014, V. Putin commented on the state of 
affairs in Ukraine after Euromaidan, opposing the Europe’s position to the 
Russian one he emphasized: 
21. Therefore I believe, that our position was completely verified and 
objective from the very beginning (Putin 2014с). 
Again the actor points out that the decisions are based on pragmatic 
position of well- considering, which is expressed in pragmatizing marker of 
right and thought, putting it into words ‘completely verified and objective’.  
5.4.2 Germany 
 
 The German actors also apply pragmatizing markers quite often 
while appealing to the resolution of conflict in Ukraine. For instance, 
Foreign Minister Steinmeier in his statement from the 25
th
 of April 2014 
claiming for prompt settlement points out: 
22. In fact, every day of violence and confrontation put us away from 
the diplomatic settlement of the conflict. Each side should use some 
common sense now! (Steinmeier 2014a).  
Here the actor urges that diplomatic solution is the rational way out for the 
both conflicting sides, and uses the figure of speech ‘use some common 
sense’, which corresponds with the group of pragmatizing markers of right 
and thought.  
 Further on, at the WDR-Europaforum, which was held on the 8
th
 of 
May 2014, the Federal Chancellor A. Merkel defines concretely, how this 
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solution can be achieved highlighting that the German position towards the 
situation in Ukraine is pragmatic:  
23. I believe that it is right at least. Firstly, It is right to continue talks, 
and secondly, to make it clear that we are supporting Ukraine. I 
have claimed three points in the German Bundestag: to support 
Ukraine meaning that people in Ukraine are free to choose how they 
want to shape their own future, secondly, to keep the conversation 
channel open and to find the solutions in diplomatic way and thirdly, 
if all this does not succeed, to continue imposing the sanctions 
(Merkel 2014).  
In this example the actor justifies the German position and uses the figure 
of speech ‘it is right’, the pragmatizing marker of right and thought. 
Moreover, coming up to the solution of the problem, the actor uses the 
figure ‘to keep the conversation channel open’, which corresponds to the 
pragmatizing marker of ISS. Thus, the chancellor notes, that the pragmatic 
actor should continue seeking for dialogue. Later on she emphasizes the 
following:  
24. It is true that every state has a right to sue for the violence. But it is 
also true that we should act cleverly. It is essential for every 
politician in the world. At the same time, it is not easy at all to find a 
right way (Merkel 2014). 
By using figure of speech ‘act cleverly’, the actor opposes it to the path of 
violence making it sound as non-pragmatic, as far as it contradicts to the 
concept of right and thought.  
 The idea of using dialogue as a pragmatic solution of the conflict, 
Foreign Minister Steinmeier notes: 
25. We can stop escalation and find a political solution only if both 
sides discuss directly all the problems and open questions and if they 
are ready to strive for resolution of conflict together and with mutual 
respect (Steinmeier 2014b). 
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Again the actor claims for pragmatic action, which is possible in terms of 
ISS, and he uses the figures of speech ‘discuss directly’ and ‘strive 
together’.  
 Nevertheless, while the conflict worsened, the use pragmatizing 
markers showed some changes. At the joint press conference of German 
Federal Chancellor A. Merkel and French President F. Hollande, which 
was held on the 20
th
 of December 2015, a little bit after the negotiations in 
the Normandy Format took place in Minsk, it was mentioned: 
26. In my opinion, it is absolutely worthwhile to do everything to end 
the bloodshed (Merkel 2015). 
Again this example reflects the structure of Practical Syllogism, where the 
second premise is covered in the figure of speech ‘absolutely worthwhile’, 
and the action is concluded in the figure ‘to do everything to stop the 
bloodshed’. Thus, the pragmatizing marker of profit supports the emotional 
marker of humanism, so any action which considers the value of human life 
is presented as pragmatic. This idea was repeated in the following 
statement:  
27. But I still believe, that it is right, that we do everything to avoid 
human losses and let people, who live who live under extremely 
difficult conditions (you might have seen the situation in Donetsk and 
Lugansk on TV), breathe with relief and live further (Merkel 2015). 
The German actions are justified by the markers of right and thought and 
humanism, put into figures of speech ‘it is right’ and ‘do everything to 
avoid human losses’ respectively.   
5.5 Conclusions to the chapter 
 I have sought with the help of a rhetorical analysis answers to my 
first research question: “By means of what rhetorical tools do leaders of 
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Russia and Germany pragmatize their foreign policy choices?” The tools of 
rhetoric are pragmatizing markers, and I have managed to identify five 
groups of them: profit, right and thought, institutionalism, humanism, and 
ISS. As far as the system of language is very flexible, these groups are 
realized through the use of various figures of speech, which may differ 
from the name of the group, nevertheless, these figures concern the use of 
synonyms and word combinations conceptually suitable to this or that 
group.  
 According to the results of the analysis, the conditions of the case are 
slightly influential on the use of pragmatizing markers. By this I mean, that 
frequency of applying markers may differ in case of cooperation from the 
case of conflict, of different points of view. 
 However, these conditions do not have a strong impact on the choice 
of pragmatizing markers, as far as some mechanisms were found in the 
speeches belonging to all three cases.  
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6. Comparative analysis 
 In order to make a comparison more visible, I made up the following 
diagram. It shows what groups of pragmatizing markers were applied by 
Russian and German political leaders in three separate cases, and how often 
they were used.  
 Here it can be seen that the overwhelming majority belongs to the 
pragmatizing markers of right and thought (13) as well as the ISS marker 
(12). Also the marker of profit is quite well employed (10). As for 
‘emotional’ markers of institutionalism and humanism, they are used more 
rarely: they were applied 6 and 4 times respectively.   
 
 Since the comparison implies detecting general points and 
differences, I would like to start with the former.   
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6.1 Common spaces 
 According to the diagram, representatives of both countries use all 
five groups of pragmatizing markers, which makes it possible to claim that 
these mechanisms of pragmatization are commonly shared, and perhaps 
they are a universal, rhetoric tool, or at least something that characterizes 
foreign policy reasoning and rhetoric. 
 The case of Nord Stream pipeline demonstrates the overwhelming 
use of pragmatizing group of profit by both states. The condition of 
cooperation excludes the marker of ISS, because the dialogue has been 
already found, so there is no need to appeal for it. The ideas of humanism 
and institutionalism also are absent from this case. This can be explained 
with the circumstances of the project: it does not affect these values. 
 By contrast, the case of Syria shows that pragmatizing marker of ISS 
is the most popular here. Although Russia and Germany have different 
point of view on the situation, they both claim for the same solution; that is 
why the marker of ISS is so widely used. Neither of the countries neglects 
the fact of human losses; hence, the pragmatizing marker of humanism 
occurs often. Taking into account, that Russia supports regime of the 
current president, while Germany encourages the opposition, it is not 
surprising that both apply the marker of institutionalism although they do 
so for different ends. 
 Results of analysis of the Ukrainian crisis are quite diverse, which 
might be explained with condition of conflict. Again, both sides appeal to 
ISS as a resolution of the current state of affairs. However, the 
overwhelming majority of the markers are of right and thought, which 
highlights conflicting positions of the states, as far as each side represents 
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its actions as the only right and well-considered, accusing the other of 
lacking these parameters.   
6.2 Differences  
 Moving on to differences, it is necessary to make comparisons within 
each case separately. 
 In the case of Nord Stream, the Russian actors diversify their rhetoric 
with pragmatizing markers of right and thought, while the German ones 
come to nothing more than markers of profit. It is worth mentioning, that 
the latter marker is always applied when talking about the actor’s side 
(meaning Russian and German decisions, which are beneficial to 
themselves) adding that the other actors can also profit from this project. 
The example of using the marker of right and thought corresponds to the 
decision made by Denmark, not Russia and Germany. The lack of the other 
markers in German rhetoric can be explained that the idea of the project 
was initially proposed by the previous Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who 
belongs to The Social Democratic Party of Germany, while Chancellor 
Merkel’s party is The Christian Democratic Union of Germany. Hence, this 
opposition of parties may have influenced the way the project is threated, it 
is highly probable, that Schröder’s rhetoric can illustrate a wider usage of 
pragmatizing markers. Still, the empirical base of this thesis is restricted 
with timeframe, so the rhetoric of the previous Chancellor is not included 
in this analysis.  
 The case of Syrian crisis shows the full spectrum of pragmatizing 
markers used by the Russian actors, while the German ones preferred only 
three groups of them. Unlike Germany, Russia applies markers of right and 
thought, and profit: both markers mostly support the idea of 
institutionalism emphasizing its pragmatic nature by standing as the second 
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premise of practical syllogism. Referring to the German examples, the 
marker of institutionalism is not the conclusion of the syllogism, but the 
second premise itself; i.e. that the statement of the syllogism sounds like 
‘the Assad’s regime is not legitimate’, it contradicts the pragmatic idea of 
institutionalism, which allows the German leaders to appeal for Syrian 
authorities to act pragmatically. Moreover, this opposition of 
pragmatism/not pragmatism justifies German actions towards Syrian 
problematics.  
 As for the case of the Ukrainian crisis, the German rhetoric tools 
prevail over the Russian due to the spectrum of the pragmatizing markers 
used, and to the frequency of their occurrence. Interestingly enough, the 
Russian actors avoid applying markers of humanism, while the German 
ones are not very keen on markers of institutionalism. Another curious 
difference is that German political leaders use the marker of profit, which 
reminds of Russian side in the case of Syria: again, this marker is used in 
order to support another one and it is set as the second premise of the 
practical syllogism; in this case, it is humanism. Probably, such a use of 
pragmatizing marker of profit in the cases of political crisis can be justified 
with the idea, that they emphasize pragmatic nature of the emotional 
markers, although, the latter are used successfully even separately. Taking 
this into account, one may claim, that Russian actors tend to pragmatize the 
value of institutionalism (like in case of Syria), and German ones are biased 
with the value of humanism (according to the case of Ukraine).  
6.3 Conclusions to the chapter 
 Comparing the peculiarities of using the pragmatizing markers in the 
rhetoric of Russian and German political leaders, it was found out, that 
actors of both countries exploit all five groups of the markers to some 
stance. The cases of conflict and different points of view urge the actors to 
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resort to the model of ISS, while the case of cooperation is the most 
favorable for the marker of profit. In the conditions of conflict, the use of 
pragmatizing marker of right and thought significantly increases in both 
countries.  
 Nevertheless, there are some interesting differences between Russian 
and German uses of pragmatizing markers. This enables me to answer the 
second research question of this thesis: “What are the differences in the 
ways of pragmatization applied by Russian and German actors?” The first 
point is a diversity of the markers used: Russian political leaders make their 
rhetoric more variable in cases of cooperation and different point of views 
and German ones does it in case of conflict. Secondly, Russian actors tend 
to pragmatize with the help of institutional value, while German 
representatives prefer the value of humanism, which can be traced through 
the cases of Syria and Ukraine.  
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Conclusions 
 
 This thesis has sought to figure out by means of what rhetorical tools 
leaders of Russia and Germany pragmatize their foreign policy choices, and 
reveal the differences in the ways of pragmatization applied by Russian and 
German actors. The analysis of the empirical data has revealed that these 
rhetorical tools are the pragmatizing markers, which are installed by means 
of practical syllogism. 
 Pursuing these aims, I tried to introduce a basis of rhetorical strategy 
of political leaders with the help of rational choice theory. This theory 
promotes the idea that each actor pursues the aim of utility maximization, 
so they always act pragmatically. At the same time, the critique of the 
rational choice theory highlights that in fact this is not always so. Hence, 
the critical approach to the rational choice theory provides the opportunity 
for opposition of pragmatic versus non-pragmatic action, which becomes 
the basis of political rhetoric, when the actors want to justify their position, 
or accuse the opponents in making wrong (non-pragmatic) decisions, so it 
allows the actors claiming for the opponents to act pragmatically. 
 Then, I managed to prove that Aristotelian doctrine of practical 
syllogism can work as mechanism of pragmatization in political rhetoric, 
where the major premise is installed due to the critical approach to rational 
choice theory, so one actor appeals to another one claiming ‘be 
pragmatic!’. Pragmatizing markers appear either in minor premise, or in the 
very conclusion, as far as the markers can work differently: implicitly, 
when they serve as the second premise, or explicitly, when the marker is 
the action. In the latter case the action is often supported by another 
pragmatizing marker, which is put as the second premise again. 
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 With the help of rhetorical analysis, I managed to identify five 
groups of pragmatizing markers: profit, right and thought, institutionalism, 
humanism, and ISS. As far as the system of language is very flexible, these 
groups are realized through the use of various figures of speech, which may 
differ from the name of the group, nevertheless, these figures concern the 
use of synonyms and word combinations conceptually suitable to this or 
that group.  
 According to the results of the analysis, the conditions of the case 
(cooperation by example of the Nord Stream Pipeline project; differing 
points of views by the Syrian crisis; conflict by the Ukrainian crisis) are 
slightly influential on the use of pragmatizing markers. By this I mean, that 
frequency of applying markers may differ in case of cooperation from the 
case of conflict, of different points of view. 
 However, these conditions do not have a strong impact on the choice 
of pragmatizing markers, as far as some mechanisms were found in the 
speeches belonging to all three cases.  
  The comparative analysis of pragmatizing markers in the rhetoric of 
Russian and German political leaders has revealed that actors of both 
countries exploit all five groups of the markers to some stance. The cases 
of conflict and different points of view urge the actors to resort to the 
model of ISS, while the case of cooperation is the most favorable for the 
marker of profit. In the conditions of conflict, the use of pragmatizing 
marker of right and thought significantly increases in both countries.  
 Nevertheless, there are some interesting differences between Russian 
and German uses of pragmatizing markers. This enables me to answer the 
second research question of this thesis: “What are the differences in the 
ways of pragmatization applied by Russian and German actors?” The first 
point is a diversity of the markers used: Russian political leaders make their 
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rhetoric more variable in cases of cooperation and different point of views 
and German ones does it in case of conflict. Secondly, Russian actors tend 
to pragmatize with the help of institutional value, while German 
representatives prefer the value of humanism, which can be traced through 
the cases of Syria and Ukraine.   
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Appendix 1 – Translations  
 
English Russian 
1. On this basis Russia and Germany 
propose to strengthen their relations 
in the field of energy in the spirit of 
long-term strategic energy 
partnership for the good of both 
countries and the whole Europe 
(Putin 2005). 
1. На этой основе Россия и 
Германия намерены и далее 
укреплять свои отношения в 
энергетической сфере в духе 
долгосрочного стратегического 
энергетического партнерства на 
благо обеих стран и Европы в 
целом. 
2. For both countries it is profitable 
to cooperate deeply in the field of 
energy sources upstream and 
downstream (Putin 2005). 
2. Углубленное сотрудничество в 
области разведки и добычи, а 
также сбыта и переработки 
энергоресурсов выгодно для обеих 
сторон. 
3. And this cooperation has stood the 
test of time completely. I am sure, it 
shows very good mutual results, and 
provide more than a quarter of total 
volume of the gas consumed by the 
European Union. This makes 
approximately 140 billion cubic 
meters per year (Medvedev 2010a). 
3. И это сотрудничество в полной 
мере выдержало проверку 
временем. Я уверен, что оно 
приносит очень хорошие взаимные 
результаты, а в наши дни 
обеспечивает более четверти 
общего объёма газа, который 
потребляется Европейским 
союзом. Это около 140 
миллиардов кубических метров в 
год.  
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4. This is a sign of good relations, 
partnership, which our countries 
have. I would like to remind, that 
Denmark was the first to agree for 
pipeline building through their 
territorial waters. And I think that it 
is a wise decision. Why? Because the 
pipeline is not the project, which 
only the Russian Federation needs, 
or, let us suppose, some other 
countries, which stand at the end of 
the gas pipeline, do. This is our 
common business, moreover, a 
profitable one (Medvedev 2010b). 
4. Это признак добрых отношений, 
партнёрства, которые существуют 
между нашими странами. Хочу 
напомнить, что Дания первой дала 
разрешение на прокладку 
газопровода через свои 
территориальные воды. И мне 
представляется, что это было 
мудрое решение. Почему? Потому 
что газопровод – это не тот проект, 
который нужен только для 
Российской Федерации или, 
допустим, для каких-то стран, 
которые стоят на конце газовой 
трубы. Это наше общее дело, ещё 
и выгодное дело. 
7. We have pointed it out several 
times, that it is necessary to keep to a 
peaceful way to fulfil the legal 
directing of the people of Near East 
and Northern Africa by means of 
broad national dialogue without any 
foreign interference. This approach 
fits into the standards of international 
law (Lavrov 2011a). 
7. Мы неоднократно подчеркивали 
необходимость придерживаться 
мирного пути реализации 
законных устремлений народов 
Ближнего Востока и Северной 
Африки посредством широкого 
национального диалога, без 
вмешательства извне. Такой 
подход полностью вписывается в 
нормы международного права. 
8. We do everything possible to stop 
the bloodshed, to set the sides to 
negotiate, when the Syrians 
8. Делаем все, что в наших силах, 
чтобы прекратить кровопролитие, 
усадить стороны за стол 
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themselves are to come to an 
agreement about the future political 
structure of their country (Lavrov 
2012). 
переговоров, в ходе которых сами 
сирийцы должны согласовать 
параметры будущего 
политического устройства своей 
страны. 
9. We have said that several times to 
our western partners, but our appeals 
have had no response yet (Bogdanov 
2012). 
9. Об этом мы не раз говорили 
западным партнерам, но наши 
призывы пока не находят у них 
отклика. 
10. They keep talking obstinately, 
that regime in Damascus is 
illegitimate, that President Assad 
should step down, but we suppose, 
that such claims have no legal 
platform and do not advantage the 
cause (Bogdanov 2014). 
10. Они упорно продолжают 
говорить, что режим в Дамаске 
нелегитимен, что президент 
Б.Асад должен уйти, но мы 
считаем, что подобные заявления 
не имеют правовой основы и не 
идут на пользу дела. 
11. At this stage it is necessary to get 
the most useful benefit of existing 
international legal framework for the 
settlement of the Syrian issue. It is 
based on the relevant UN Security 
Council resolutions, in particular in 
resolutions 2042 and 2043, as well as 
in the Geneva document, and 
contains a set of powerful tools to 
stop the violence and start peaceful 
negotiations. Losing this basis would 
be unwise. (Bogdanov 2012). 
11. На данном этапе необходимо 
извлечь максимум полезного из 
уже имеющейся международно-
правовой базы урегулирования 
сирийской проблемы. Она 
основана на соответствующих 
решениях СБ ООН, в частности 
резолюциях 2042 и 2043, а также 
Женевском документе, и содержит 
набор эффективных инструментов, 
чтобы положить конец насилию и 
запустить мирный, переговорный 
процесс. Терять эту основу было 
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бы неразумно. 
12. We are ready for further 
partnership with the states of the 
region on the basis of equality and 
mutual benefit with full respect to 
their traditions, history, and culture 
(Lavrov 2011b) 
12. Готовы продолжать развивать с 
государствами региона 
партнерство на основе 
равноправия и взаимной выгоды, 
при полном уважении их 
традиций, истории и культуры. 
18. They supported an 
unconstitutional armed take-over, 
declared these people legitimate and 
are trying to support them. By the 
way, despite all of this we have been 
patient and even ready to cooperate; 
we do not want to disrupt our 
cooperation (Putin 2014a). 
18. Они поддержали 
антиконституционный переворот и 
вооружённый захват власти, 
объявили этих людей 
легитимными и стараются их 
поддержать. Кстати говоря, мы и в 
этом случае полны терпения и 
даже готовности на какое-то 
сотрудничество, мы не хотим 
прерывать сотрудничество. 
19. Did our partners in the West and 
those who call themselves the 
government in Kiev now not foresee 
that events would take this turn? I 
said to them over and over: Why are 
you whipping the country into a 
frenzy like this? What are you doing? 
But they keep on pushing forward 
(Putin 2014a). 
19. И наши партнёры на Западе, и 
те, кто называет себя властью 
сегодня в Киеве, они что, не 
прогнозировали, что это будет 
происходить? Я же им тысячу раз 
сказал уже: зачем вы раскалываете 
страну, что вы делаете? Нет, всё 
равно прут буром, что называется. 
20. Russia is being very careful in its 
action and is taking a very balanced 
and respectful line towards all of our 
20. Россия действует очень 
аккуратно, очень взвешенно и с 
уважением ко всем нашим 
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partners (Putin 2014b). партнёрам. 
21. Therefore I believe, that our 
position was completely verified and 
objective from the very beginning 
(Putin 2014с). 
21. Поэтому я считаю, наша 
позиция была изначально 
абсолютно выверенной и 
объективной. 
English German 
5. As politicians, we are interested in 
reliable energy supplies, of course. 
The Nord Stream Pipeline, the 
second pipe strand of which will 
have been built soon, is a good 
pattern for this (Merkel 2011). 
5. Wir haben als Politiker natürlich 
Interesse an einer verlässlichen 
Energieversorgung. Die Nord 
Stream-Pipeline, deren zweiter 
Leitungsstrang jetzt ja auch gebaut 
wird, ist dafür ein Beispiel. 
6. So, it can be said, that both 
importing countries and Russia profit 
from the pipeline (Merkel 2011). 
6. So kann man sagen: Die 
Abnehmerländer und Russland 
profitieren gleichermaßen von der 
Pipeline. 
13. In order to avoid further 
escalation, all the representatives of 
political power especially the 
Government should act responsibly 
and seek for a dialogue (Westerwelle 
2011a). 
13. Alle politischen Kräfte und 
insbesondere die Regierung müssen 
verantwortungsvoll handeln und den 
Dialog suchen, um eine weitere 
Eskalation zu vermeiden. 
14. We appeal to President Assad to 
change his radical course. The 
problems of the Syrians can be 
solved only in the way of dialogue 
and plausible reforms, but not with 
the help of violence (Westerwelle 
2011b). 
14. Präsident Assad ist aufgefordert, 
einen radikalen Kurswechsel zu 
vollziehen. Statt mit Gewalt können 
die Probleme Syriens nur im Weg 
des Dialogs und glaubwürdiger 
Reformen gelöst werden. 
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15. The regime must finally end its 
brutal course and respond to the 
legitimate demands of the opposition. 
Only on this basis a valid national 
dialogue is possible that must lead to 
genuine democracy and political 
participation (Westerwelle 2011c). 
15. Das Regime muss endlich seinen 
brutalen Kurs beenden und auf die 
legitimen Forderungen der 
Opposition eingehen. Nur auf dieser 
Grundlage ist ein glaubhafter 
nationaler Dialog möglich, der zu 
Demokratie und echter politischer 
Teilhabe führen muss. 
16. The Federal Government 
demands the president Assad to stop 
violence against the peaceful 
demonstrators immediately. Only 
immediate change and significant 
dialogue with the will to change can 
stop the further bloodshed 
(Westerwelle 2011d). 
16. Die Bundesregierung fordert von 
Präsident Assad ein unverzügliches 
Ende der Gewalt gegen friedliche 
Demonstranten. Nur sofortige 
Umkehr und ein ernsthafter Dialog 
mit dem Willen zum Wandel können 
noch größeres Blutvergießen 
verhindern. 
17. We are confident that our clear 
and firm message will not fall on 
deaf ears in Damascus (Westerwelle 
2011e). 
17. Außenminister Westerwelle: Wir 
setzen darauf, dass unsere 
unmißverständliche Botschaft in 
Damaskus nicht auf taube Ohren 
stößt. 
22. In fact, every day of violence and 
confrontation put us away from the 
diplomatic settlement of the conflict. 
Each side should use some common 
sense now! (Steinmeier 2014a). 
22. Im Gegenteil: Jeder Tag mit 
Gewalt und Konfrontation entfernt 
uns weiter von der Möglichkeit einer 
diplomatischen Entschärfung des 
Konflikts. Alle Seiten müssen jetzt 
zur Vernunft kommen! 
23. I believe that it is right at least. 
Firstly, It is right to continue talks, 
23. Ich glaube, dass es zumindest 
richtig ist, einerseits die Gespräche 
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and secondly, to make it clear that we 
are supporting Ukraine. I have 
claimed three points in the German 
Bundestag: to support Ukraine 
meaning that people in Ukraine are 
free to choose how they want to 
shape their own future, secondly, to 
keep the conversation channel open 
and to find the solutions in 
diplomatic way and thirdly, if all this 
does not succeed, to continue 
imposing the sanctions (Merkel 
2014). 
immer weiterzuführen und zweitens 
deutlich zu machen, dass wir die 
Ukraine unterstützen. Ich habe im 
Deutschen Bundestag einmal drei 
Dinge genannt: die Ukraine zu 
unterstützen und zwar in dem Sinne, 
dass die Menschen in der Ukraine 
frei entscheiden können, wie sie ihre 
eigene Zukunft weiter gestalten 
wollen , zweitens den 
Gesprächskanal offen zu halten und 
auf diplomatischem Wege Lösungen 
zu finden und drittens, wenn das alles 
keinen Erfolg hat, eben auch immer 
wieder Sanktionen in den Raum zu 
stellen. 
24. It is true that every state has a 
right to sue for the violence. But it is 
also true that we should act cleverly. 
It is essential for every politician in 
the world. At the same time, it is not 
easy at all to find a right way (Merkel 
2014). 
24. Es ist so, dass jeder Staat das 
Recht hat, für sich auch das 
Gewaltmonopol einzuklagen. Es ist 
zum Zweiten so, dass man klug 
handeln muss. Das gilt für alle 
Politiker auf der Welt. Dazwischen 
immer den richtigen Weg zu finden, 
ist natürlich auch nicht einfach 
25. We can stop escalation and find a 
political solution only if both sides 
discuss directly all the problems and 
open questions and if they are ready 
to strive for resolution of conflict 
25. Nur wenn beide Seiten im 
direkten Gespräch alle Probleme und 
offenen Fragen ansprechen und bereit 
sind, miteinander und mit 
gegenseitigem Respekt auf eine 
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together and with mutual respect 
(Steinmeier 2014b). 
Konfliktlösung hinzuarbeiten, lassen 
sich die Eskalationsspirale stoppen 
und Wege für eine politische Lösung 
finden. 
26. In my opinion, it is absolutely 
worthwhile to do everything to end 
the bloodshed (Merkel 2015). 
26. Es ist meiner Meinung nach aber 
absolut lohnend, alles zu tun, damit 
weiteres Blutvergießen vermieden 
wird. 
27. But I still believe, that it is right, 
that we do everything to avoid 
human losses and let people, who 
live who live under extremely 
difficult conditions (you might have 
seen the situation in Donetsk and 
Lugansk on TV), breathe with relief 
and live further (Merkel 2015). 
27. Ich glaube aber nach wie vor, 
dass es richtig ist, dass wir alles 
daransetzen, dass Menschenleben 
nicht weiter verloren gehen und dass 
die Menschen, die unter 
ausgesprochen schwierigen 
Bedingungen dort leben - man muss 
ja nur einmal die Fernsehbilder von 
Donezk und Lugansk sehen -, wieder 
ein Stück aufatmen können und 
ihrem Leben nachgehen können. 
 
 
